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I. INTRODUCTION

Sweeping demographic changes have dramatically increased
religious heterogeneity in the Federal Republic of Germany since
the approval of its constitution (Basic Law) by the Parliamentary
Council and the Allied Powers in 1949.1
Due to Muslim
immigration largely from Turkey, 2 immigration by members
of

1.
The Parliamentary Council intended the Basic Law to be temporary
because the division of Germany excluded many from participating in its drafting
and ratification. See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [ESSENTIALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 34-35 (20th ed. 1995). To ensure the document
would not entrench this division, the drafters avoided the term "constitution" in

favor of "Grundgesetz" or 'Basic Law." See id. Since the unification of the two
German countries and in light of the lasting meaning and importance of the Basic
Law, it is fair to characterize the Basic Law as a constitution. See id. The terms
are used interchangeably in this Article.
2.
The Islamic Council in Germany estimated the number of Muslims at
2.3 million in 1994, and a 1997 estimate placed the number of Turkish Muslims
at over 2 million, out of a total population in Germany of around 82 million. See
Stefan Mfickel, Streit um den muslimischen Gebetsruf[Dispute over the Muslim Call
to Prayed, 12 NORDRHEIN-WESTFALISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLATTER 1 (1998). Very
reliable data is available for the number of Turkish citizens living in Germany. In
1961, 6700 Turkish citizens lived in Germany (West). By 1987, the number had
risen to 1,422,700. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1995
FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1995 FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 67 (1995) [hereinafter publications in this series
are identified as STATISTICAL YEARBOOK with the applicable year]. At the end of
December 1997, the number of Turkish citizens stood at 2,107,426 in Germany
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other minority religious groups, 3 reunification with a dramatically

secularized East Germany, 4 and declining religious affiliation in

the western German states,5 Germany has proportionally far
fewer people affiliated with the Protestant6 and Catholic churches

as a whole. See BEAUFTRAGTE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FOR AUSLANDERFRAGEN, DATEN
UND FAKTEN ZUR AUSLANDERSITUATION [DATA AND FACTS ON THE SITUATION OF
FOREIGNERS] 21 (1998). Most members of Islam are Turkish, but the last federal
census took place in 1987 and no more recent data about the number of Muslims
or their breakdown by nationality is available from the federal government. The
1987 census counted 1,650,952 members of Islam, including about 48,000
Germans (some of Turkish descent), about 1,325,000 Turkish citizens, and about
75,000 citizens of Yugoslavia. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1993, supra, at 68.
Immigration from the former Yugoslavian states during the past ten years has
probably increased their share in the total Muslim population. See id.
3.
Citizens of other countries, or immigrants that now have German
citizenship, contribute significantly to the Greek, Syrian, and Serbian orthodox
churches. See BUNDESZENTRAL FOR POLITISCHE BILDUNG, REPORT BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS ON THE SITUATION OF
FOREIGNERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN 1993 48-49 (1994).
Immigration is also adding to the Jewish population, which remained relatively
constant at about 27,000 during the 1970s and 1980s, see STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
1993, supra note 2, at 107, but has grown from 33,692 in 1991 to 61,203 in
1996, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1997, supra note 2, at 99, primarily due to
immigration from eastern Europe. Immigration has also contributed significantly
to the number of Catholics in Germany. See BEAUFTRAGTE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG
FOR AUSLANDERFRAGEN, BERICHT DER BEAUFTRAGTEN DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FOR
AUSLANDERFRAGEN OBER DIE LAGE DER AUSLANDER IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [REPORT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S COMMISSIONER FOR
FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS ON THE SITUATION OF FOREIGNERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY] 81-82 (1997). About 40,000 Buddhists live in Germany, as do about
90,000 immigrants from primarily Hindu countries, including Sikhs. See icL
4.
The official name for East Germany was the German Democratic
Republic. In 1990 the states of East Germany, through the action of the central
East German government, adopted the Basic Law and became states of the
Federal Republic of Germany. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of
German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 475, 476-77, 526-27, 531 (1991).
5.
Between 1970 and 1989 the total number of Protestants belonging to
the main Protestant church, as defined infra at note 6, dropped from 28.3 million
to 25.1 million, while the total number of Catholics fell from 27.2 to 26.7 million.
See "Liebster Jesu, wir sind vier . . .," ['Dearest Jesus, we are four . .. ] DER
SPIEGEL, no. 52, 1997, at 58, 59 [hereinafter DearestJesus].
6.
The Protestant Church (die Evangelische Kirche) is a national
organization in Germany. It encompasses 24 regional churches (Landeskirchen)
which are either Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), or United. With the exception of
Bavaria, the boundaries of the regional churches do not correspond to the
modem state boundaries, but to boundaries of the German states in the early
nineteenth century. The current affiliations of the regional churches correspond
to the historical affiliations of the states in which they were once located, and
each regional church has local member congregations of the same denomination.
The term "Protestant Church" in this article refers to this specific organization.
The term does not refer to Protestants who are not members of this organization,
including, for example, Baptists, Mennonites, or those who belong to a Lutheran,
Reformed or United congregation in a region in which the Protestant Church has
a different regional church affiliation. See Otto Frhr. von Campenhausen, Die
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than it did even ten years ago, as well as wide regional differences
in religious beliefs. 7 In 1961, more than ninety-five percent of
West Germans belonged to one of the two main churches, 8 but by
1987 this number had sunk to around eighty-four percent; 9 after
reunification it fell to around sixty-seven percent in Germany as a
whole, and to less than thirty percent in the former East German
states. 10

These changes have created difficulties for the relationship
between religion and government under Germany's Basic Law.
The Basic Law, which prohibits a "state church" and guarantees
the free exercise of religion, rejects "strict separation" in part by
protecting certain institutional relationships between the states
and religious organizations. 1 In practice, these institutions have
12
included primarily the large Protestant and Catholic churches.
Three of the most contentious religion cases in the history of the
Federal Republic of Germany are now pending in the courts; in all
three, traditional religious minorities1 3 are challenging the
institutional relationship between the large churches and the
government. 14
The first case, now before the Federal Constitutional Court,
involves an action to compel the state of Berlin to award a group
of Jehovah's Witnesses special status as a "corporate body under

Organizationder evangelischen Kirche [The Organizationof the Protestant Church],
in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 381,
381-96 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed. 1994).
7.
See DearestJesus, supranote 5, at 59.
8.
See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1974, supra note 2, at 47. Reference to the
two "main," "principle," or "large" churches means the Catholic church and the
Protestant church as described in footnote 6.

9.

See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1997, supra note 2, at 63.

10.
See id. at 97-98; see also DearestJesus, supranote 5, at 59 (describing
the weakness of organized religion in the former East Germany and the decline of
the churches in Germany generally).
11.
See infratext accompanying notes 99-103.
12.
Alexander
Hollerbach,
Grundlagen
des
Staatskirchenrechts
[Foundationsof the Public Law of Churches], in 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 471, 540, 546-47 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof
eds., 1989) [hereinafter Public Law of Churches]; Stefan Korioth, Islamischer
Religionsunterrichtund Art. 71ff GG [Islamic Religious Instruction and Article 7 HI of
the Basic Law], 16 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVWZ] 1041, 104647 (1997).
13.
This term includes everyone not affiliated with the main Protestant and
Catholic churches and those with no religious alfiliation. See also infra text
accompanying note 167.
14.
Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprinted in 50 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2397 (1997) (Jehovah's Witnesses case); 93
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal;
Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 1 (1995) (classroom crucifixes case). The case
concerning religious instruction in Brandenburg, discussed infra in Section
IV.A. 1., has not reached a decision.
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public law,"1 5 a status that the large churches already enjoy, and
which brings with it privileges such as the power to collect taxes
from church members through the state. 16
Eligibility of the
Jehovah's Witnesses for this status hinges on (1) whether the
group offers the requisite "loyalty to the state" even though its
members may not vote, and (2) whether the "loyalty to the state"
criterion itself infringes the group's religious liberties. 17 The case
is widely viewed as an important precedent for how the German
states and courts will resolve bids by Muslim groups for this
status. 18
In the second case, the former East German state of
Brandenburg, whose residents are overwhelmingly without
religious affiliation, refuses to provide religious instruction in the
schools pursuant to Article Seven of the Basic Law. 19 Parents
and churches have brought suit in the Federal Constitutional
Court to force Brandenburg to comply with Article Seven. 20 In
the third case, the Federal Constitutional Court struck down a
law providing for crosses in Bavarian public school classrooms, a
decision that shocked and outraged scholars and the general
public. 2 1 Bavaria responded by amending its law-which still

provides that public school classrooms shall include a cross-to
permit local school officials to remove the crosses when
confronted with objections from parents or students.2 2
The
Bavarian Constitutional Court upheld the new law against a facial
attack on August 1, 1997, in a decision that will probably be
23
considered soon by the Federal Constitutional Court.
As Germany confronts the problems that come with religious
pluralism, the United States increasingly struggles with the
problem of how to include religion in public life. This shift arises
in part from the force of a point long made in Germany, namely
that excluding religion from public life improperly disadvantages
it, and the related argument that secularism has no special claim
to constitutional legitimacy. Both have reached a crescendo in

15.
See Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprintedin 50 NJW
2397 (1997) (Jehovah's Witnesses).

16.

See infra Part IV.B.

17.
See id.
18.
See infra note 198.
19.
See infra Part V.A. 1.
20.
See id.
21.
93 BVerfGE 1 (classroom crucifixes case).
22.
See infra Part V.A.3.
23.
The Court has rejected two challenges to the law on procedural
grounds, while other challenges are pending in the Bavarian courts. See infra
note 402.
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the United States, 2 4 and the Supreme Court's response is clear.
From Rosenberger v. Rector s and Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette2 6 to Bowen v. Kendrick2 7 and Agostini v.
Felton,28 religion is increasingly finding its way into the public
sphere. Yet even as we usher out "separation,"29 we have no clear
vision of how greater integration will function. When and how, for
example, may the government engage in religious speech? What
are the limits on the government's power to fund religious
organizations as part of a "neutral" general program?
The
tendency of courts and commentators alike is to increasingly view
the heart of the Establishment Clause as the protection of
individual religious freedom, rather than the structural separation

24.
For representative examples, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 105-23
(1993) [hereinafter CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF]; FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS,
THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE 29-43, 117-22 (1995); STEPHEN V. MONSMA, POSITIVE NEUTRALITY:
LETTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RING (1993); Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-

Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 724-26 (1997); Mark E. Chopko, Religious
Access to Public Programs and Government Funding,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645,
653-71 (1992); W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism,
Secularism, and the TransformativeDimensionof ReligiousInstitutions, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 421, 456-60; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock,
Neutrality Toward Religion]; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 129, 168-69, 175-94 (1992) [hereinafter
McConnell, Crossroads];Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and Privatizationof
Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 21-25 (1991); Micheal Stokes Paulsen, A Funny

Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional
Conditions 'Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 653, 658-62 (1996) [hereinafter, Paulsen, A Funny Thing]; Steven D. Smith,

Separation and the 'Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67
TEx. L. REV. 955, 995-1003 (1989); E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks

Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1187-1202 (1994). For the best
argument that the Constitution does establish a secular public order, see
Katherine M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195
(1992).
25.
515 U.S. 819 (1995) (rejecting Ohio's claim that the Establishment
Clause required it to bar the Ku Klux Klan from placing a cross in a public plaza
in front of the Ohio statehouse).
26.
515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that a university funding program for
student publications could not exclude otherwise eligible religious publications).
27.
487 U.S. 589 (1988) (rejecting a facial Establishment Clause challenge
to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which provides cash grants to both religious
and secular organizations for counseling and research on adolescent sexuality).
28.
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (reversing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
and upholding a federal program that provides remedial assistance to
disadvantaged private school students, most of whom attend parochial schools,
where much of the remedial instruction takes place).
29.
See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62

GEo. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
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of religion and government. 30 This shift has brought American
and German case law considerably closer in Establishment
Clause matters; German cases, it turns out, suggest several
limitations on the notion that individual liberty should be the sole
31
engine of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
This Article considers the three prominent cases in Germany
and how they speak to pressing Establishment Clause issues in
the United States. The case involving religious instruction in the
schools and the Jehovah's Witnesses case question the legitimate
secular goals that the government may pursue through funding or
support of religious organizations, an issue that remains open in
the United States.
The third case, crosses in public schools,
raises questions of government religious speech similar to those
that continue to divide the Supreme Court and scholars in the
United States.
In both areas, the German cases illustrate
weaknesses in an approach to the Establishment Clause that
views the clause as a means of protecting private religious choice
from government pressure and influence.
Section II outlines the American context for these issues,
focusing on the growing importance of private religious choice
analysis in the case law and literature, and concluding with a
summary of what the German cases suggest for American private
choice reasoning. Section III gives a brief overview of the Articles
of the Basic Law that protect religious freedoms. Section IV takes
up the Jehovah's Witnesses and religious instruction cases and
argues that they suggest weaknesses in the private religious
choice analysis in government funding cases in the United States.
Finally, Section V addresses the dispute surrounding crosses in
the Bavarian schools and the limitations of private religious
choice analysis in government religious speech cases.

II.

PRIVATE RELIGIOUS CHOICE IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

Early Establishment Clause cases worked from the premise
that

30.

government

and

religion

should

remain

separate. 32

See infra Part II.

31.
See infra Parts IV.C., V.B.
32.
See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 217 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Zorach v. Clausen,
343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 212 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 51-52 (Rutledge
J., dissenting) (1947). See generally Ira C. Lupu, supra note 29, at 233-37.

Although there is some disagreement about how accurately the word "separation"
captures the Court's approach even in early cases, see Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 48, 53-65 (1997)
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Separation, the Court reasoned, protects both religion and
government from the potentially damaging influence of the
other,33 discourages sectarian rivalries, 3 4 and keeps the
government "neutral."35 This logic produced the infamous Lemon

test, which requires that government action (1) have a secular
purpose, (2) that it neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3)
3 6
it

that

avoid

entanglement

of

and

government

religion.

Separation, as the Lemon test suggests, is driven largely by
concerns about the institutional relationship between government
and religion, not "coercion, loss of liberty, or other individualized
37
interests."
Private

religious

beliefs

have

always,

difficulties for the separationist position.

however,

In

created

cases involving

financial aid to religious organizations, separation itself was at
times justified on the grounds that the government may not

coerce taxpayers to support (through public financing) religious
beliefs with which they disagree. 38 But private religious beliefs
also provided the basis for what would become a successful
challenge to the core of the separationist position. As Justice
Stewart pointed out in his lone dissent in Abington School District
v. Schempp,3 9 secular compulsory public schools cannot be
defended as "neutral" to those who favor religious education for

their children. 40
Professor Giannella
similarly attacked
separation as non-neutral in a religious society, reasoning by

[hereinafter Laycock, Underlying Unity], the Author uses it because the Court
described and legitimated its reasoning in this way.
33.
See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring); Everson, 330
U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-35; McCollum, 333
U.S. at 212.
34.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971); Epperson, 393
U.S. 97, 104; Engel, 370 U.S. at 442-44 (Douglas, J., concurring); Zorach, 343
U.S. at 318-19 (Black, J., dissenting); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216-17 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Everson, 330 U.S. at 27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); 53-54
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
35.
See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222; Engel, 370 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211-12; Zorach, 343 U.S. at 318 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
36.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
37.
Lupu, supranote 29, at 235.

38.

See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251-52 (1968) (Black, J.,

dissenting); see also Lupu, supra note 29, at 235 (explaining that the Court
created an exception in Establishment Clause cases to the rule against taxpayer
standing, but reasoning that this "reinforced the character of the clause as a
polity principle rather than a rights principle" because a rights system "limits
party status to those . . . whose own interests are sharply implicated by
governmental action").
39.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40.
Id. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 235
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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hypothesis that an all-powerful state would have to build
churches in order to remain neutral toward the religious practices
of its people. 4 1 Ultimately, the Court itself failed to follow through
on its separationist promise. Instead, it upheld a number of
government practices that "aided" religion on the grounds that to

deny religious groups the services or money in question would

"hamper ...

42
citizens in the free exercise of their own religion,"

or because the financial benefit of the aid accrued largely to
private individuals who chose to direct the assistance in ways
that benefited religious organizations.4

By the 1990s the argument that the Court improperly
disadvantaged religion by promoting an overly secular state had
moved to center stage in Establishment Clause scholarship, 4 4 in
part due to general post-modern attacks on the entire project of

41.
Donald A. Giannelia, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part ff. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 522-

23 (1968).
42.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (permitting states to
reimburse parents for costs of public transportation to both secular and religious
private schools).
43.
See Allen, 392 U.S. at 238-49 (upholding a program loaning secular
textbooks to students in both public and private schools); see also Laycock,
Underlying Unity, supranote 32, at 47-48, 53-65 (describing tension between "noaid" and "non-discrimination" approaches and pointing out that "no-aid" was
always strongest in the context of parochial schools and never had a complete
hold on the Court); McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 24, at 119-20 (listing
bizarre and inconsistent outcomes under Lemon). Even those firmly committed to
the goal of separation found private religious practices troubling.
Justice
Brennan, for example, concluded that the holiday displays in Lynch v. Donnelly
were unconstitutional, but wrote that "[ilntuition tells us that some official
'acknowledgment' is inevitable in a religious society if government is not to adopt
a stilted indifference to the religious life of the people." 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus government officials are not prevented from
"tak[ing] account, when necessary, of the separate existence and significance of
the religious institutions and practices in the society they govern." Id. This
gesture to the religious institutions of the "people" had little, however, to do with

most of the speech that Justice Brennan concluded would not violate the
Constitution: that which had lost its religious meaning through repeated use, that
which is useful to the government for "solemnizing public occasions" or that
which recognizes national history and culture. Id. at 715-17. The starting
assumption that such speech represented the "people's" institutions went
unexamined, and the filters used to strain out unconstitutional (or constitutional)
speech had little to do with this underlying rationale.
44.
See GEDICKS, supra note 24, at 117-25; STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 82-83, 99-117 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE]; Berg,
supra note 24, at 705, 721-26; Chopko, supra note 24, at 656-60; Laycock,
Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 24, at 1003-04; McConnell, Crossroads,
supra note 24, at 117-34; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 795, 800-11 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, Lemon is Dead].

1136

VAIVDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1127

neutrality. 45 A powerful and pervasive government that excludes
religion from public life, critics argued, marginalizes religion and
fails to recognize that a secular state has no special claim to
either neutrality or constitutional legitimacy. 4 6
As a result,
scholars increasingly focus on government's impact on individual

autonomy, reasoning that the Establishment Clause guards
against government influence on religious choice or "personal
choices concerning religious beliefs and practices."4 7 The term
"private religious choice" in this Article refers to these "personal
choices" or, stated another way, "the individual process of
48
reaching and practicing religious beliefs."
The claim that religion should "flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma," 4 9 without the

45.
See GEDICKS, supranote 24, at 9-10, 29-37; Durham & Dushku, supra
note 24, at 443-46; McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 24, at 134-35. This also
gives rise to the claim that liberalism and deeply held religious belief are at odds
because liberalism privileges those who debate based on "reason" and
marginalizes those whose argue based on transcendent powers. See CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 24, at 213-32 (arguing that modem liberalism
improperly excludes religious reasoning); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling
the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997)
(arguing that deeply held religious beliefs and liberalism are inherently
incompatible). For an attempt to justify liberalism's privileging of certain types of
reasoning from the perspective of those with deeply held transcendent views
(including religion), see John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 765 (1997).
46.
See GEDICKS, supra note 24, at 117-25; SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE
supra note 44, at 82-83, 99-117; Berg, supra note 24, at 705, 721-26; Chopko,
supra note 24, at 656-60; Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 24, at
1003-04; McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 24, at 117-34; Paulsen, Lemon is
Dead,supranote 44, at 800-11.
47.
Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor Government Cooperationwith
Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 25-26 (1997); see also JESSE
H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE RELIGION CLAUSES 9 (1995) [hereinafter CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY];
STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 111-14 (1996); Berg, supra note 24, at 703;

Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118,

130-134 (1993) [hereinafter Carter, The Resurrection?];Laycock, Neutrality Toward
Religion, supra note 24, at 1001-02; McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 24, at
168-69, 175; Wallace, supranote 24, at 1255.
48.
Wallace, supra note 24, at 1255 (citing McConnell, Crossroads,supra
note 24, at 175). There are some difficulties with this term. For many, religious
actions are not the product of "personal choice," but of divine commandment, and
religious beliefs themselves are not "chosen" but imposed by a higher authority.
MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 6 (1996). The term "private religious
choice" refers to the government in the sense that "choice" is something that the
government distorts and constrains, but the term, as used here, does not exclude
divinely imposed beliefs or actions.
49.
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); see also Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). Early commentary that advanced
this position includes Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
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influence of government, is not new. However, the focus on
individual autonomy generally, and private religious choice
specifically, has unquestionably moved from the perimeter to the
center of Establishment Clause scholarship, even if it has not led
to agreement on how the courts should resolve specific issues.5 0
Private religious choice forms the core of a particularly
influential approach to the religion clauses, which is advanced
most prominently by Professors McConnell and Laycock. This
position's "underlying principle" holds that "governmental action
5
should have the minimum possible effect on religion." '
Government violates the Free Exercise Clause by "inhibiting
religious practice," and it violates the Establishment Clause "by
forcing or inducing . . . contrary religious practice[s]." 5 2 Termed

"religious

pluralism,"

3

"voluntarism,"5 4

or

"substantive

s

neutrality," this reasoning from private religious choice holds
that the government may not exclude religious speech from a
public forum simply because it is religious, nor may it deny

otherwise

qualified

religious

groups access

to

government

funding.5 6 If the government excludes religious groups from
public programs and fora, it creates incentives for such groups to
secularize; through these incentives, the government distorts
private religious decision-making and thus violates the
57
Constitution.

Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968) and Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual
Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion under the First Amendment, 45 U.
CHI. L. REv. 805 (1978).
50.
Compare, CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 47, at 121
n.67, with McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 24, at 183-86, and Douglas G.
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 313, 348-52
(1996) [hereinafter Laycock, ReligiousLiberty as Liberty], with Wallace, supra note
24, at 1254-55.
51.
McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 24, at 169; see Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, supranote 50, at 313.
52.
McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 169.
53.
Id.
54.
See Berg, supranote 24, at 694, 705. The term "voluntarist" has other
meanings even in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See also SANDEL, supra
note 48, at 62-65 (1996) (using the term in a similar way but also to capture the
view that religion itself is a choice, or a "flife-style," and arguing that this view
leads to cases that refuse special protections for religious liberty, because religion
is treated simply as one choice among many, a position that McConnell and
Laycock would reject).
55.
Laycock, Neutrality TowardReligion, supranote 24, at 1001.
56.
See Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 50, at 349-52;
McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 24, at 183-88.
57.
See Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 50, at 349-53.
Professor Choper reasons that government violates individual liberty when it
taxes constituents and then finances "core" religious activities with which they
disagree. Jesse H. Choper, Dangers to Religious Liberty from Neutral Government

1138

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1127

The Court has responded to the attack on separation by all
but abandoning the Lemon framework and the institutional
concerns on which it rests.5 8 In its place, the Court has tended to
retreat to high ground, leaving more to the political process.5 9 As
Justice Kennedy explained in Allegheny:
the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in
our society .... A categorical approach would install federal courts
as jealous guardians of an absolute "wall of separation," sending a
clear message of disapproval. In this century, as the modem
administrative state expands to touch the lives of its citizens in
such diverse ways and redirects their financial choices through
programs of its own, it is difficult to maintain the fiction that
requiring government to avoid all assistance to religion can in
60
fairness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.
Justice Kennedy concluded that the government can
"accommodate" 6 1 religion
by
"declaring public
holidays,"
"installing or permitting festive displays," and "sponsoring
celebrations and parades" because "the principles of the
Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic traditions of
diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable
judgments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgment of
62
holidays with both cultural and religious aspects."
The Court also, however, increasingly resolves Establishment
Clause cases by considering the relationship between the
government action and private religious choices. For example, the
Court now routinely holds that religious speech in public schools
and in public fora that is attributable to individual private
speakers and their choices does not violate the Establishment

Programs, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 727 (1996). The pluralist position reasons
that a taxpayer's interests do not extend to neutral funding programs that also
happen to advance religion. See McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 185-86.
Although Choper describes a "broad consensus" that taxes in support of religious
activities pose the "central threat" to religious liberties, CHOPER, SECURING
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supranote 47, at 16, he offers little to support this claim. See
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74
TEx. L. REv. 577, 584-586 (1996) (describing Choper's claim as "simply untrue").
58.
For the most recent example, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997
(1997). See generally Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 44, at 813-25.
59.
See McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 137-68.
60.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657-58 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61.
Id. at 664. Justice Kennedy has been criticized for his use of the term
"accommodation" here by those who interpret "accommodation" as the lifting of a
government-imposed burden on religious exercise by private individuals. See
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof CeremonialDeism, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 2083, 2171-73 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 687 (1992).
62.
See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 663 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Clause if the school or the fora is generally open to similar non63
religious speech.
Government religious speech cases typically turn on the
impact of the speech and the setting on individual listeners and
observers. 6 4 In cases involving aid to religious organizations, a
majority of the Court focuses on the role of private choice as the
vehicle directing the aid to the organization in question.6" Perhaps
no case illustrates the Court's shift better than the 1997 Agostini
decision, when the Court reversed its 1985 decision in the same

63.
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 752
(1995) (holding that the placement of a cross by the Ku Klux Klan in a public
square near the Ohio capitol building did not violate the Establishment Clause);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that
Christian films shown on public school property are consistent with other uses of
the property and not a violation of the Establishment Clause); Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that the Christian Club could meet on
school premises, as other clubs did, without violating the Establishment Clause);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that religious student groups
could meet on campus like other student groups without violating the
Establishment Clause).
In all four cases, the government relied on the
Establishment Clause as a defense to the claim that it infringed on the free
speech rights of the plaintiffs. The Court's rejection of the defense meant that the
government had to give the religious groups access to the public space in
question.
64.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down a high school
commencement prayer), illustrates just how much the Court's reasoning has
changed. In Weisman, five members of the Court embraced some version of the
"coercion test," which asks, in this context, whether the government's actions
coerce participation in a "formal religious exercise." Id. at 586. In Engel, on the
other hand, the Court invalidated a prayer written by state officials and recited in
public school classrooms, but based its reasoning entirely on the role of the
government in drafting the prayers, emphasizing that a showing of coercion was
unnecessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation. Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430-35 (1962). Justice Kennedy considered the government's role in
sponsoring and shaping the contents of the prayer in Weisman as well, but in
order to show that the prayer qualified as government, not private, speech. His
inquiry did not end there, as it could have under Engel, but went on to hold that
the social pressures on the student to participate in the prayer made it
unconstitutional. The four members of the Court who did not apply a test based
solely on coercion reasoned that "endorsement" falling short of "coercion" can
violate the Establishment Clause, relying in part on institutional concerns.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 604-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65.
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1992)
(upholding state-funded sign-language interpreter for a student who chose to
attend a religious high school); Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997)
(reversing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and permitting state teachers to
conduct remedial instruction classes in private schools); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 832-34 (1995) (upholding aid to
student religious publications as part of a general program of aid to student

publications); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986) (upholding educational grant to blind student who chose to attend a
Christian college).
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case. 6 6 Public funding pursuant to "criteria that neither favor[s]
nor disfavor[s] religion," 6 7 the five member majority reasoned,
ensures that if public resources ultimately go to religious
institutions they do so via individual private choice (in this case to
parochial schools). 6 8 Moreover, "neutral" funding criteria do not
"give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs
or practices in order to obtain those services," and accordingly
insulate the program from Establishment Clause claims. 69 This
70
is precisely the logic and the language of the pluralist position.
German cases and commentary, as the balance of this Article
argues, illustrate a number of problems for pluralist reasoning. In
funding cases, pluralists push to ensure that religious groups
may participate in public welfare programs on the same terms as
secular groups. 7 1 By including religious groups, they reason, the
government creates no incentives for such groups to secularize in

order to receive government funding. 72

The government has,

however, a great deal of power to promote certain messages or
viewpoints with its own money, and the German cases make clear
that this power has the potential to impact private religious
beliefs and choice when religious groups are included in general
funding programs.
The German government and Basic Law, for example, provide
support to religious organizations in part because they foster
personal values that the government and the drafters of the Basic
Law deemed important to the success of democracy. 73 The courts
must now decide what criteria the government may use to
distinguish among religious groups to advance this goal.
Similarly, in the United States, as public programs fund religious
groups to advance secular purposes, those purposes themselves,
and the criteria they create for public funding, have the potential
to distort the practices of the groups that participate, or hope to
participate. 7 4 When, if ever, does the distortion based on secular
66.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
67.
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014.
68.
See id. at 2011-12.
The dissent strongly disagreed with this
characterization of the facts, reasoning that in this case a public agency provides
aid directly to schools, not to, or at the explicit request of, students. See id. at
2024-25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The four member dissent also relied on
institutional concerns that animated the separationist position: government
support compromises religion and creates strife. Id. at 2020.
69.
Id. at 2014.
70.
See supranotes 51-57 and accompanying text.
71.
McConnell, supra note 24, at 180, 183-88; Laycock, Religious Liberty
as Liberty, supranote 50, at 349-53.
72.
Id.
73.
See infra Part IV.

74.

This observation of course is not new. Protecting religion from the

influences of government has long been understood as central to the religion
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criteria become so great as to violate the Constitution? I argue in
Section IV(C) that an analysis of individual religious choice
provides an answer to establishment questions only when it is
considered in terms of the goals served by private religious choice
75
in what some have termed "responsive democracy."
German cases discussed in Section V also give reason to
question the relationship between government religious speech
and private religious choice.
In this country, advocates of
pluralism are sharply split over the problem of government
religious speech. Some reason that the "closest approximation to
substantive neutrality is for government to be silent on religious
matters," because "[g]overnment is large and highly visible," and
will invariably favor one religious group, or "it would model one
form of religious speech or observance as compared to others."7 6
Others argue, as the German courts do, that purely secular
speech by the government has exactly the same power to
influence private views of the listener toward the secular instead
of the religious. 7 7
Government should thus "mirror[ ]" the
religious life of "the culture as a whole," when it engages in
religious speech by, for example, installing many kinds of
religious and cultural symbols throughout the year.7 8 What this
version of the pluralist view does not want, however, is
government religious speech that represents only a watered-down,
broadly acceptable version of private religion, because this
distorts private practices and favors "government-induced
79
homogeneity" or a "civil religion."

clauses, and a reason to insist that government and religion remain separate. "It
is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and
controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer
who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with
and dependent upon the government." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.

203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Those advocating participation of
religious groups in public welfare programs, however, which includes every
author cited in footnote 31, fail to discuss this point.
75.
76.

See infra text accompanying notes 286-97.
Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 32, at 72; see also Berg, supra

note 24, at 745; Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious
Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841, 843-44 (1992). Many others who do not
subscribe to the voluntarist position also reject religious speech by the
government. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 61; Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in
Public Life-Reasons for Minimal Access, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633 (1992);
Kenneth L. Karst, The FirstAmendment the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992).
77.
See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81
NW. U. L. REv. 146, 161-166 (1986); Wallace, supranote 24, at 1255-56.
78.
McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 193.
79.
Id. at 168-69, 190.
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The German courts have long focused on individual
autonomy as the key to government religious speech cases and
have applied three corresponding limitations on government
religious speech: (1) the speech must not take place in a coercive
setting, (2) it must avoid "proselytization," and (3) it must
correspond to private religious speech, as constituents choose to
express that speech in public space.8 0 With the rhetoric of
separation on the wane, U.S. courts have relied increasingly on
"coercion" and the dangers that it poses for religious freedom in
resolving government religious speech cases.8 1 The two countries
now both face the question of what exactly qualifies as
unconstitutional coercion. An even more difficult question arises,
however, in explaining exactly how the constitutions limit
government religious speech that is not coercive. Many have
may not engage in
reasoned that 8 2 the government
"proselytization," or that it may not "endorse" a religion, religion
83
generally, or non-religion, because of its impact on the listener.
The furor around the German crucifix case challenges an
approach based on the autonomy of the listener by asking what
we make of government religious speech with which all listeners
agree.8 4 The answer comes again, I argue in Section V(B)(2), from
a normative view of how the political system should8s function, and
not solely from the goal of protecting private choice.
The third German perspective may be the most foreign to the
American reader: German courts insist that government religious
speech, particularly in the schools, can advance the religious
freedoms and choices of individual constituents who want the
government to engage in that speech. 8 6 This justification relies
both on constituents' private religious practices and on
individuals' preferences as to how those practices get expressed in
This approach both builds on and attacks
public space.
McConnell's notion of pluralist "mirroring."8 7 The Germans mix
this "mirroring" with the somewhat conflicting justification that
the speech must also correspond to the greatest degree possible to
a consensus of the community's religious desires. Professor
McConnell seeks to avoid such "consensus" or "majority" speech

80.

See infra Part V.A.

81.

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of Allegheny v.

ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
83.

concurring).
84.
85.
86.
87.

See infra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 443-47 and accompanying text.
See McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 193.
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because it tends to distort actual private religious practices. 88
McConnell's position may provide a theoretically attractive way of
reconciling government speech and private religious choice, but it
provides no way of realizing this goal in a democratic system.
Assuming that government speech is either the product of
majority capture or some sort of consensus, neither provides the
"mirroring" that the pluralist position seeks. The German cases,

on the other hand, focus on compromise and consensus as
normative guides for how local officials should function. Section
V(B)(3) takes up these issues.8 9

III. OVERVIEW OF RELIGION AND THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION

The German Constitution provides extensive protection for
religious freedoms. Article Four makes "inviolable" "freedom of
faith and of conscience" and "the freedom to profess a religion or a
particular philosophy."90
It also guarantees the "undisturbed
practice of religion," the right to refuse military service "involving
the use of arms,"9 1 and that no one may be "disadvantaged or
favored" based on religious or political opinions. 9 2 A series of
Articles incorporated into the Basic Law by reference to the
Weimar Constitution of 191993 provide even more detailed
rights: 94 eligibility for public office and the enjoyment of civil and
political rights are "independent of religious denomination;"9 5 no
one may be compelled to disclose their religious convictions, 9 6 to
take "a religious form of oath," or to participate or perform any

88.
89.
90.

See id. at 168-69, 188.
See infra text accompanying notes 441-92.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 4(1) (F.R.G.). All translations of

the text of the Basic Law are those of the German government in its English
language version of the Basic Law. The government's entire translation of the
Basic Law is reprinted in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 343-412 (1994).

91.

GG arts. 4(2), 4(3).

The Basic Law does not explicitly limit these

liberties, in contrast to the protections afforded to religious self government. See
CURRIE, supra note 90, at 263. The Court has held, however, that the religious
freedoms protected in Article Four are limited by other constitutional rights
protected by the Basic Law. Id. at 252-55.

92.

GG art. 3(3).

93.
Although the Weimar Republic lasted only from 1919 until 1933, in
part because of problems with the Constitution, it did include a comprehensive
Bill of Rights. CURRIE, supranote 90, at 5-6.
94.
Article 140 of the German Constitution formally incorporates these
sections of the Weimar Constitution into the Basic Law.
95.
WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG [Constitution] art. 136(1), 136(2) (Weimar
Republic) [hereinafter WRV].
96.
See WRV art. 136(3).
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religious act; 9 7 freedom of religious association is guaranteed, as
is the right of religious associations to own property and acquire
legal capacity. 98 The autonomy of every religious body in the

administration of its own affairs is guaranteed "within the limits
of the law valid for all."9 9
The Basic Law provides, again by reference to the Weimar
Constitution, that "there shall be no state church." 10 0 It explicitly
protects, however, Sunday and public holidays as "days of rest
from work and of spiritual edification." 10 1 Moreover, the Basic
Law preserves several institutions in which state and religious
bodies cooperate closely. Religious groups, for example, "shall
remain corporate bodies under public law insofar as they have
been in the past," and such corporate bodies "shall be entitled to
levy taxes in accordance with [state] law on the basis of the civil
taxation lists." 10 2 Article Seven provides that voluntary religious
instruction "shall form part of the ordinary curriculum in public
schools."10 3 Neither institution is, however, limited to particular
churches or religious groups, and Article 137 (5) of the Weimar
Constitution explicitly provides that other religious groups may
become corporate bodies under the public law if "their
constitution and the number of their members offer assurance of
their permanency."10 4
The extent to which this status and
religious instruction in the schools must be opened to other
religious groups, or modified in light of the religious diversity of
the country, is the question now facing the German courts.

97.
98.

WRY art. 136(4).
See WRV art. 137(4), 138(2).

99.
WRV art. 137(2)-(4). This limitation has not kept the Court from
requiring exceptions from generally applicable laws where those laws infringe on the
rights of religious groups to self-government. The Court has reasoned instead that
laws with greater impact on religious groups are not "laws that apply to everyone,"
and on this basis has required a number of exceptions for religious groups from
laws governing the rights of employees, the internal management of hospitals, and
labor relations. CURRIE, supra note 90, at 263-66; see also Donald P. Kommers,

West German Constitutionalismand Church-State Relations, in GERMAN POLITICS &
SoCiETY 11, 16 (1990).
100. WRV art. 137(1).
101. WRV art. 139.
102. WRV art. 137(5), 137(6).
103. GG art. 7(3).
104. WRV art. 137(5).
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IV. GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF "DEMOCRACY"
AND PRIVATE RELIGIOUS CHOICE

Religious instruction and the status "corporate body under
public law" have long historical pedigrees in Germany.' 0 5 The
Weimar Constitution of 1919, like the Basic Law of 1949,
preserved both institutions, which already had a firm place in
German society.10 6 Nonetheless, the framers of both constitutions
debated at length about whether to protect the institutions; many
argued in both 1919 and 1949 for greater separation of church
and state.10 7 The decision in 1949 to simply adopt the language of
the Weimar Constitution is understood as a "formal compromise;"
the drafters, in other words, punted. 108
The institutions are justified as important to the success of a
peaceful, democratic Germany. Commentators reason that
religion provides a basis for moral and ethical values essential to
both the success of democratic government and the well-being of
the people.' 0 9 As Professor B6ckenf6rde, former Judge on the
Federal Constitutional Court, famously put it: "the free and
secular state depends on conditions that it cannot itself
guarantee."" 0
Religious groups serve these purposes by
developing "morally responsible people,""' citizens bound by
ethics and notions of responsibility," 2 or people with "tolerant"

105. Churches' status as corporate bodies under public law dates back to
the 17th century. See ALFRED ENDROS, ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG DES
BEGRIFFS "KORPERSCHAFT DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS" [ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE CONCEPT OF "CORPORATE BODY UNDER PUBLIC LAW"] 14-16 (1985).
106. 1 OTTO VOLL, HANDBUCH DES BAYERSISCHEN STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS
[HANDBOOK OF BAVARIAN PUBLIC LAW OF CHURCHES] 103 (1985); ENDROS, ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF "CORPORATE BODY UNDER PUBLIC LAW," supra note

105, at 12-25.
107. Hollerbach, PublicLaw of Churches, supranote 12, at 479-80, 48588; Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Zur Kruziix-Entscheidung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [On the Crucifix Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court], 121 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 448, 455-56
(1996) [hereinafter Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the CrucifixDecision].

108. Hollerbach, Public Law of Churches, supra note 12, at 471, 479-80,
484-88.
109. Id. at 516, 525.
110. Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenforde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang
der Sdkularisation[The Origin of the State as a Process of Secularization], in STAAT,
GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSTHEORIE UND ZUR VERFASSUNGSRECHT

60 (1976).
111. Hollerbach, PublicLaw of Churches, supranote 12, at 516, 525.
112.
Christoph UnkX Religionsunterrich, in II HANDBUCH DES STAATSIIRCHENRECHTS
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUrSCHLAND 507-09 (Joseph List1 & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter Link, RelgionsuntenirA.
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and "democratic" sensibilities and "social responsibility on the
Both their participation in
basis of individual autonomy." 113
providing tangible public services such as daycare centers and
hospitals, and their contribution to the personal basis of
communal and political life, legitimize the special status that
religious groups enjoy under the German constitution. 114
Germany's institutional protections for religious groups
originally arose from the relationship between the government
As long as the
and the two large Christian churches. 1 15
institutions included only traditional Christian groups, or others
that shared a basic commitment to what the state saw as
democratic values, 1 16 it was easy to reconcile the government's
interest in promoting "democratic" values with the interests of
religious autonomy. For example, the two large Churches, to
which about ninety-five percent of the population belonged,
appeared unlikely to use religion classes to undermine the state
or its constitutional bases. This was as true in 1949 as it was in
1919.
The horrors of National Socialism had weakened the
position of the state, but generally strengthened the position of
churches; churches were understood by many as both opponents
and victims of the Third Reich and could, many hoped, give
democracy a permanent home in Germany. 1 17 Exactly the same

113.
F. MOLLER, DAS RECHT DER FREIEN SCHULE NACH DEM GG 135 [THE LAW OF
FREE SCHOOLS UNDER ARTICLE 135 OFTHE BASIC LAW] (2d ed. 1982).
114. For other examples see Holerbach, PublicLaw of Churches, supranote
12, at 618-19, 664-65; GOTFRIED HELD, DIE KLEINEN OFFENTLICHEN-RECHTLICHEN
RELIGIONSGEMEINSCHAFTEN IM STAATSKIRCHENRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK [SMALL
PUBLIC LAW RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE PUBLIC LAW OF CHURCHES OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 31-35 (1974); Paul Kirchhof, Die Kirchen als Krperschaft
des 6ffentlichen Rechts [Churches as Corporate Bodies Under Public Law], in I
HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 651, 65153 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed. 1994); AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, ERZIEHUNGSAUFTRAG UND STAATLICHE SCHULTRAGERSCHAFT [THE TASK
OF EDUCATION AND STATE SUPPORT OF SCHOOLS] 146 (1967) [hereinafter THE TASK OF
EDUCATION]; VOLL, 1 HANDBOOK OF BAVARIAN PUBLIC LAW OF CHURCHES, supra note
106, at 105.
See HELD, supra note 114, at 45-49 (corporations under public law);
115.
Korioth, supranote 12, at 1046.
116. The institution of corporate bodies under public law has long been
formally open to other religious groups, and many have applied for and received
the status. See infra text accompanying notes 226-32. What is new is that a
group has applied that meets the formal criteria set out in the Basic Law, but
which the government does not consider supportive enough of the state's
democratic basis to merit the status.
117.
See Ulrich Scheuner, Kirche und Staat in der neuen deutschen
Entwicklung [Church and State in the New GermanDevelopment], 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 225, 252-54 (1959/60); Rudolf Smend, Staat und
Kirche nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz [State and Church Under the Bonn Basic
Law], 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 4, 7-12 (1952). The Author
uses the term "church" here intentionally; these articles speak specifically in
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claim is made today in reference to religious instruction in the
former East Germany, where many believe that democracy has
not fully taken root.1 1 8
Popular opinion holds that religion
classes in the schools will counter right-wing ideology and
119
violence by promoting values central to peaceful co-existence.
Pluralism has pushed the system into a corner. While the
balance of the Constitution makes clear that these institutions
must be opened to other religious groups, the state no longer feels
confident that all such groups will promote, or at least refrain
from undermining, the state's very basis. This is the specific
reason given for excluding Islam and the Jehovah's Witnesses
from these institutions. 12 0 Yet how may the religiously "neutral"
state distinguish among religious groups that seek to participate
in these institutions, and when do the criteria infringe on the
groups' rights to religious freedom? Brandenburg's refusal to
provide traditional religious instruction at all, 12 1 on the other
hand, challenges the starting assumption that such religious
instruction serves democracy, and will force the courts to resolve
another question: is religious instruction an individual,
affirmative right against the state?
A. Religious Instruction in the German Schools

The Basic Law, in Article Seven, section three, provides that
religion classes are part of the regular curriculum in German

terms of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. For contemporary criticism, see
Klaus Obermayer, Staatskirchenrecht im Wandel [Public Law of Churches in
Transformation], 20 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 9, 10-11 (1967) (characterizing
these authors as promoting an advantaged position for the large churches and
discussing the problems that this raises for a state committed to religious
neutrality). The resistance that churches and individual Christians offered to
Hitler and his government is deeply disputed. See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus,
Daniel Goldhagen'sHolocaust, 65 FIRST THINGS 36 (1996) (book review). The point
here is merely that the experience of National Socialism did not undermine, and
perhaps even strengthened, the view that churches and religion help provide the
basis for democracy.
118. State elections in the small former East German state of SaxonyAnhalt serve as one example. In the April 1998 elections, the former East
German communist party received 20% of the vote and the radical, right-wing
"German People's Union" received 13% of the vote, and more than 25% of the
votes cast by those under 25. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Germany: Anger on the Right,
WASH. POST, May 1, 1998, at A15.
Both parties are reasonably hostile to
democracy itself, meaning that about one-third of this year's voters in SaxonyAnhalt may have a questionable commitment to this form of government.
119.
See Richard Schr6der, Kommt die heidnische Republik? Der Niedergang
der Kirchen und der M43brauch der Religion [Is the Heathen Republic Coming? The
Decline of Churches and the Abuse of Religion], DER SPIEGEL, Dec. 22, 1997, at 62.
120.
See infra text accompanying notes 185-90, 259-63.
121.
See infra text accompanying notes 140-65.
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public schools,1 2 2 with the exception of secular (bekenntnisfrei)
schools. 123
The Basic Law makes student and teacher
participation in such classes strictly voluntary, although parents
make the decision for their children until they reach the age of
fourteen. 12 4 Because religious instruction forms part of the
regular curriculum (ordentliches Lehrfach), it is a required
subject--except for students whose parents do not want them to
participate-that the state has no choice but to offer on equal
footing with other required courses.125 Students who do not
participate may be required to take another class, and they do not
have a free period.12 6 The state pays for the religious instruction
even when it is provided by church officials, 12 7 the state trains its
religion teachers, and religion is a class for which grades can be
given that count in determining whether a student advances to
28
the next grade. 1
Article Seven, section three, of the Basic Law also provides
that religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the

122. There is obviously no question as to whether this practice is
"constitutional." Professors Monsma and Soper seriously confuse this issue when
they comment that "[a] 1975 case decided by the Constitutional Court dealt
directly with the issue of religious instruction in the public schools." STEPHEN V.
MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE
IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 178 (1997).
The authors were referring to the
Interdenominational School Cases, which resolved the constitutionality of public
schools based on Christianity. Those cases had virtually nothing to do with
formal religious instruction, except that the court used religious instruction to
support its conclusion that the Basic Law could not have intended to make
schools free of religion.
123. Secular (bekenntnisfrei) schools, according to a leading commentator,
currently play no meaningful role in Germany. Alexander Hollerbach, Die
Religionsunterrichtals ordentlichesLehrfach an den 6ffentlichen undfreien Schulen
in derBundesrepublik Deutschland[Religious Instruction as a Regular Curriculum in
the Public and Free Schools in the Federal Republic of Germany], in
RELIGIONSUNTERRICHT HEUTE 212, 214 (A. Biesinger & T. Schreijack eds., 1989).
124. See Link, Religionsunterricht,supra note 112, at 477. In Bavaria and
Saarland, the age is eighteen. See id.
125. 74 BVerfGE 244, 251 (1987).
126. Theodor Maunz, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 7 [Commentary on
Article 7 of the Basic Law] in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR § 7, at 33 (Theodor Maunz
et al. eds., 1980).
127. Id. The details of how the state reimburses religious groups for the
costs of religious instruction provided by religious officials is generally regulated
by detailed contracts between religious groups and the states; these contracts
also regulate other details of religious instruction in the states. For a detailed
look at how the states pay for religious instruction by religious officials,
particularly in the somewhat unusual case of Baden-Wfirttemberg, see Alexander
Hollerbach & Christoph Gramm, Staatliche Ersatzleistungfur den evangelischen
Religionsunterricht[Public Substitute Coursesfor ProtestantReligiousInstruction], 36
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 17 (1991).
128. 42 BVerfGE 346 (1976).
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tenets of the applicable religious group. 12 9 Although religious
instruction is understood as a responsibility and matter of the
state,1 3 0 this language in Article Seven gives religious groups the
13 1
right to determine the goal and content of their religion classes.
Students are accordingly divided into separate classes for
religious instruction according to their faith, and the instruction
32
is not limited to history, culture, or general morals and ethics.'
The Federal Constitutional Court has instead described the
content of the courses as confessionally-bound education, which
"
teaches religion as the atruth. las
The states-with the exceptions of Bremen, Berlin and
Brandenburg, discussed below-have arrived at a variety of
arrangements for providing religious instruction as a regular
subject of instruction in the public schools, while ensuring that
instruction comports with the tenets of the relevant religious
group. 13 4 For example, those who teach religion in the public

schools are either state teachers selected or approved by the
religious group in question, or religious officials themselves. In
either case, teachers do not give religious instruction without
135
approval of both school officials and the religious group.

129. Religious instruction "wird . .. in fibereinstimmung mit den Lehren
und Grunds~tzen der betreffenden Kirche oder Religionsgemeinschaft erteilt."
130.

74 BVerfGE at 251.

131.
132.

Id.
Id.

133.
Id. There is even an argument that such instruction must be
confessional. As the Constitutional Court noted, the framers of both the Weimar
Constitution and the Basic Law assumed that students would attend religious
instruction in their own faith. The Court was confronted with a complaint by a
student who wanted to attend classes in a different faith, with the permission of
both her parents and the religious group providing the instruction. The school
objected. The Court reasoned that as long as religious instruction did not lose its
unique character as confessional instruction, students of other faiths could be
allowed to participate at the discretion of the religious group, not the school. The
Court left unclear under what circumstances religious instruction would lose its
confessional nature, and what exactly would follow if it did.
134. For representative state laws, see Erstes Gesetz zur Ordnung des
Schulwesens im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen [First Law for Organization of the
School System in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia] § 31(l)-(2), reprinted in
AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, III DEUTSCHES SCHULRECHT § 810, at 7 (1998);
Gesetz zur Ordnung des Schulwesens im Saarland [Law on the Organization of
the School System in Saarland] § 11 (1989), reprinted in III AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, § 1010, at 11; Schulgesetz ffir Freistaat Sachsen [School Law for
the Free State of Saxony] §§ 18-20.
135.
See, e.g., Schulgesetz fir Baden Wfirttemberg [School Law for BadenWfirttemberg] § 97, reprintedin GESETZE DES LANDES BADEN-WORTTEMBERG (1998)
(the religious groups decide on the qualifications for religion teachers. For
religion teachers provided by the church, the state and teachers decide together

regarding teachers' education and proof of suitability to teach); First Law on the
Organization of the School System in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, supra
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Similarly, the curriculum and books are either selected by the
state with the approval of the applicable religious group, by the
religious group itself, or by the religious group and school officials
together.' 3 6 To the extent that the religious groups themselves do
not teach the classes, some states explicitly provide that religious
representatives have the right to visit classes or otherwise
monitor the instruction to ensure that it is consistent with the
religious principles of the group in question., 3 7
School officials, on the other hand, have the right to ensure
that religious instruction generally conforms to school
administration and educational goals. School authorities may, for
example, ensure that discipline is maintained in religion classes,
require religious officials who teach in the public schools to
attend parent teacher conferences, and require that religious
instructors abide by the generally applicable principles when

giving grades. 13

Some states provide alternative, mandatory

instruction in "ethics" or philosophy for students who do not
participate in

religion classes, a practice that has come under

increasing attack, but which was recently
administrative court in Baden-Wfirttemberg.13 9

upheld

by

an

1. Religious Instruction as a "Right:" The Case from Brandenburg
Traditionally, disputes about religious instruction involved
issues like grading, the confessional composition of religion

note 134, § 32(l)-(5) (similar language); School Law for the Free State of Saxony
§ 18(2)-(3) (religion teachers need approval of religious group); Niedersfichsisches
Schulgesetz [School Law of Lower Saxony] § 106, reprinted in III AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN § 710.
136.
In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the curriculum and books are
selected with the agreement of the church or religious group. First Law for
Organization of the School System in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia § 33(2),
supranote 134, § 910, at 8. See also Verfassung ffir Rheinland-Pfalz [Constitution
for Rhineland-Palatinate], Art. 34, reprinted in III AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN,
supra note 134, § 900, at 2-3. In Saarland, curriculum and books need the
approval of the state. Law on the Organization of the School System in Saarland
§ 12, supra note 134, § 1010, at 11.
137.
Such visits must be coordinated with school officials. See, e.g., School
Law of Lower Saxony § 106, reprinted in III AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, supra
note 134, § 710, at 49; First Law for Organization of the School System in the
State of North Rhine-Westphalia § 33(4), supra note 134, § 1010, at 11.
138.
See, e.g., WILHELM HOLFELDER & WOLFGANG BOSSE, SACHSISCHES
SCHULGESETZ: HANDKOMMENTAR [SCHOOL LAW OF SAXONY: WITH COMMENTARY] 54-55
(2d ed. 1992).
139.
Administrative Court for Freiburg, July 1, 1997. For strong criticism,
see Johann Bader, Zur Verfassungsmdssigkeit des obligatorischenEthikunterrichts
[On the Constitutionality of Compulsory Ethics Courses], 17 NVwZ 256 (1998)
(arguing that obligatory alternative classes coerce students into taking religion
classes, especially if alternative classes are not academically comparable).
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classes, and whether school authorities disadvantaged religious
instruction in drawing-up the school calendar. 14 0 By flat-out
refusing to provide religious instruction as envisioned by Article
Seven, Brandenburg has pushed a new issue to the fore: is
religious instruction a "right" of students, parents, and religious
groups?
Brandenburg does not provide religious instruction as an
"ordinary subject," but instead offers a very controversial,
required course on "Lifestyles, Ethics, and Religion" (LER). 141 LER
teachers give information about religion, but not "in accordance
with the tenets of the applicable religious groups," as Article
Seven provides.1 42
In the early 1990s, just after the two
Germanies united, many Protestant leaders in the East rejected
religious instruction in the schools, in no small part because they
distrusted the close proximity to the state that such instruction
entails. 143 However, by the mid-1990s, both the Protestant and
Catholic churches filed suit, claiming that Brandenburg must
provide religious instruction that conforms with Article Seven.144
A faction in parliament, the Christian Democratic Union, has also
filed suit challenging Brandenburg's failure to provide religious
instruction as inconsistent with the Basic Law, as have Catholic
and Protestant parents and students. 14S

140.
141.

Korioth, supranote 12, at 1042.
141 Brandenburgisches Schulgesetz [School Law of Brandenburg] §

11(2), (4), reprinted in MARTIN W. RAMB, DAS VERHALTNIS VON KIRCHE UND STAAT
NACH DER DEUTSCHEN WIEDERVEREINIGUNG IN DER KRISE? [THE RELATIONSHIP BETVEEN

CHURCH AND STATE AFTER GERMAN REUNIFICATION INCRISIS?] 211-12 (1998).
142. See supranote 133 and text accompanying notes 129-33.
143. J6rg Winter, Zur Anwendung des Art. 7111 GG in den neuen Ldnder der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [On the Application of Article 7 H of the Basic Law in
the New States of the Federal Republic of Germany], 10 NVwZ 753 (1991). East
German church leaders were instrumental in bringing about the "velvet
revolution," but the East German church had been thoroughly infiltrated by
members of the secret police, a point that caused considerable controversy within
the church, especially after the secret police files were opened and the extent of
the infiltration became clear. JOHN P. BURGESS, THE EAST GERMAN CHURCH AND THE
END OF COMMUNISM 112-21 (1997).

144. Heinrich de Wall, Zurn Verfassungsstreit urn den Religionsunterrichtin
Brandenburg [On the Constitutional Dispute over Religious Instruction in
Brandenburg], 42 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 353, 363-64

(1997). The churches not only seek to force Brandenburg to include religious
instruction that conforms with Article Seven, but also to force Brandenburg to
stop teaching LER at all. LER, they argue, violates the state's obligation of
neutrality toward religion by presenting churches and religion in a hostile and
negative way. Id. at 354-58. Critics note that although the class includes
information about Rosa Luxemburg, Mahatma Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela, it
does not mention Martin Luther, barely refers to Jesus Christ, and includes units
on destructive religious movements in the past and prejudices in religions. Id. at
355.
145. Id.
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Brandenburg argues that it need not provide religious
instruction largely by virtue of Article 141 of the Basic Law,
which makes Article 7(3) (providing for religious instruction in the
public schools) "inapplicable in states that had other laws in place
on January, 1, 1949." 146 The Parliamentary Council adopted
Article 141 in order to exempt Bremen, where the public schools

had never included religious instruction, from the relevant
requirements of Article Seven, and it is commonly understood to
also include Berlin. 14 7 Brandenburg argues that it comes within
this exception because, as of January 1, 1949, its territorial
predecessor, the Province of Mark Brandenburg (with exactly the
territorial boundaries as the current state of Brandenburg) had
"other state laws in place." 148
Legal commentators overwhelmingly reject this claim, largely
on the grounds that Brandenburg is not a "state" within the
meaning of Article 141 because it was not a member state of the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1949.149 In addition,
commentators argue that an "unwritten" requirement of Article
141 renders it applicable only to those states that have an
uninterrupted history as part of the Federal Republic. 150
For its part, Brandenburg maintains that the separation of
students by confession in traditional religion classes is no longer
justified, particularly in courses about the important questions of
life and human cooperation. 15 1 In other words, the state of
Brandenburg has different ideas about how to secure the basis of
the democracy, illustrating that forty years of communist rule
undercut, at least to some degree, the assumptions that grounded
Article 7(3)(i) of the Basic Law. 152 Indeed, the state specifically

146.

GG art. 7(3).

147. See Link, Religionsunterricht,supranote 112, at 443-44.
148. Stefan Mficid, StaatskirchenrechtlicheRegelungen zum Religionsunterricht
[Regulation of Religious Instiction under the Public Law of Churches], 122 ARCHIV DES
OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 513, 544-45 (1997).
149. Id. at 544-45; de Wall, supranote 144, at 363-64.
150. AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, 14 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ [THE
BONN BASIc LAW], Artikel 136 bis 146, 304-05 (3d ed. 1991).

151. Paper circulated
and Sport (Oct. 15, 1991),
other new German states
incorporated the language

by the Brandenburg Ministry for Education, Youth,
reprinted in RAMa, supra note 141, at 115-16. The
have not made this argument, but have instead
of Article Seven governing religious instruction into

their own state constitutions.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SAXONY, art. 105;

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SAXONY-ANHALT, art. 27; CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF THORINGEN, art. 25, reprinted in HANS V. MANGOLDT, DIE VERFASSUNGEN DER
NEUEN BUNDESLANDER [THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW FEDERAL STATES] 194-96

(1993). The Constitution of Mecklenburg-Vorpommem incorporates the rights
protected by the Basic Law and state law explicitly provides for religious
instruction. RAMB, supranote 141, at 101-02.
152.
See GG art. 7(3)(i).
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argues that because its people are overwhelmingly without
religious affiliation, Article 7(3)(i) cannot apply to it as it does to
other states.1 5 3 The issue, many have commented, has become a
symbol of east German self-determination,' 54 all the more
important because German "reunification" has largely meant the
importation of west German institutions into the east.
Although resolution of the case may depend in large part on
the history and purpose of Article 141, it also raises questions
about exactly what sort of "right" is at issue. Traditionally,
German commentators have understood religious instruction as
an "institutional guarantee" of the Basic Law,1 s s although it
appears in the "Basic Rights" section of the Basic Law. An
"institutional guarantee" generally means that the Basic Law
protects the institution itself, with the details regulated by lawmakers. 15 6 This requires the state to provide the institution what
it needs to ensure that it thrives.' 5 7
As an "institutional
guarantee," however, religious instruction has an unclear status
as an individual right. Until the 1980s, conventional wisdom held
that parents and students, and perhaps even religious groups
themselves, had no enforceable rights to demand religious
instruction in the schools.158
This understanding of an
institutional guarantee does not include a personal right to the
institution itself, but leaves open the possibility of certain rights
within the institution, such as the right to have the instruction
conform to the tenets of the applicable religious groups, or the
right to have children attend religious instruction in their
confession, if such instruction is given. I S9 Historically, this
highly confusing theorizing mattered little: the churches provided
religious instruction in the public schools, and no questions arose
as to what would happen if they did not. 160

153.
Some commentators agree. Ludwig Renck, Zur grundrechtlichen
Bedeutung von Art. 711 GG [On the ConstitutionalSignificance of Article 7 111 of the

Basic Law], NVwZ 1171-72 (1992); Arnd Uhle, Das brandenburgischeLehrfach
Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde [Brandenburg's Required Course on
Lifestyle, Ethics and Religion], 2 KIRCHE UND REcHT 25 (1996). Most do not. See,
e.g., Mfickl, supranote 148, at 543-44.
154.
RAhMB, supranote 141, at 120-21.
155. Alexander Hollerbach, Freiheit kirchlichen Wirkens [Freedom of Church
Work], in 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 595,
614 (JosefIsensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1989) [hereinafter Church Work].

156. Carl Schmitt coined the term in reference to certain protections afforded by
the Weimar Constitution. CARL SCHMITr, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CONsnTuONAL DOCTRINE]
170 (1928).
157.
Id.
158.
Korioth, supranote 12, at 1045.
159. Id.; see also Hollerbach, Church Work, supranote 155, at 614.
160.
Korioth, supranote 12, at 1045.
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In response

Brandenburg's

to reunification generally,

refusal

to

provide

and

religious

specifically

instruction,

commentators increasingly argue that not only religious groups,
but also individuals, have a "right" to religious instruction. 16 1

Some still argue that individuals have no such right because
religious instruction depends on a willing religious group; if the
religious group refuses to participate, the state is not permitted to
substitute its own religion classes. 162 Others conclude that the
required participation of the churches does not prevent parents
and students from having individual rights to such instruction.1 63
Most agree that religious groups have either a right to religious
instruction, 164 or, phrased more narrowly, to a good faith offer by
the state to include religious instruction in the schools in
accordance with the tenets of their faith. 165
2. State Control over Content: Islamic Religious Instruction
The problem of characterizing religious instruction as a
"right" arises again when the state seeks to exclude certain
groups from providing such instruction, based on the content of
the instruction. Although this issue is not currently before the
courts, to the Author's knowledge, it has generated significant
controversy and is closely related to the case from Brandenburg,
meriting its inclusion in this Article. In Brandenburg, where there
is no longer any consensus on how religious instruction serves
democratic values, proponents
of religious
instruction

increasingly defend the institution as an individual right. 16 6

Claims for inclusion by minority groups have, however, pushed
the institution in the other direction.
Defending religious instruction as an affirmative, individual
right, suggests that the state's control over the instruction
conflicts with those religious freedoms. Thus, when it comes to
Islamic religious instruction, commentators focus on the interests
of the state-not individual parents or religious groups-as the
basis for the institution. 167 The more that the legitimacy of
religious instruction is derived from the service it provides to the
state, the more clearly it follows that the state should have some

161.

Winter, supra note 143, at 754; Mfickl, supra note 148, at 521-22; de

Wall, supranote 144, at 358-66.
162.

Korioth, supranote 12, at 1045-46; Renck, supranote 153, at 1171.

163.
164.

de Wall, supranote 145, at 363-64; Mfickl, supranote 149, at 521-22.
Mickl, supra note 148, at 521.

165.

Korioth, supranote 12, at 1046.

166.
167.

This point is particularly clear in de Wall, supranote 144, at 371.
Korioth, supranote 12, at 1047.
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control over ensuring that participating groups serve this
purpose.
State laws generally make no mention of which specific
religious groups may provide religious instruction. 168 Instead,
many states premise religious instruction on the presence of a

minimum number of students: Baden-Wfirttemberg law states, for
example, that such instruction is to be provided for "a religious

minority of at least eight students." 169 For groups of less than
eight, the schools make rooms available for religious instruction

at no cost. 170 In practice, the Catholic and Protestant churches
provide religious instruction in all the states to which Article
with these churches in mind that Article
Seven applies; it was
17 1
Seven was drafted.
The issue of who may teach religion in the schools has been
most prominent with regard to Islam. 17 2 About ten percent of all
school children in Germany are Muslim and information about
Islam is provided in one form or another by the schools in most
states. 17 3 For example, many states provide special instruction in
Turkish for Turkish students. 174 In North Rhine-Westphalia,
Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and
Bavaria, Turkish teachers (employed by the state) give
information about Islamic religious beliefs as part of this
instruction. 7 s However, there is generally no formal participation

168.
See, e.g., School Law of Lower Saxony, supra note 135, § 104; First
Law on the Organization of the School System in the State of North RhineWestphalia, supra note 134, § 35; School Law for the Free State of Saxony, supra
note 134, § 18.
School Law for Baden-Wfirttemberg, supranote 135, § 96(3), reprinted
169.
in GESETZE DES LANDES BADEN-WORTTEMBERG § 170, at 46 (1998); see also School
Law of Lower Saxony § 104(1), supranote 134, § 710, at 49 (religious instruction

is to be provided for minorities of at least twelve students at one school).
School Law for Baden-Wfirttemberg § 96(4), supra note 135, §§ 103,
170.
170.
171.
Link, Religionsunterricht,supra note 112, at 500.
172.
It is interesting that the issue of which religious groups may give
religious instruction has generated no published case law to the knowledge of this
Author. It seems that many minority religious groups do not seek to provide
religious instruction in the public schools, perhaps for a variety of reasons. In
Berlin, for example, the Catholic and Protestant churches and the Humanistic
Union provide city-wide instruction in the schools during the time that Berlin
makes space available for such classes. Jewish groups do not teach religion in
the public schools, but they do teach religion in their private schools at state
expense. Other groups have sought and gained access to schools to teach
religion, but then have chosen not do so because so few students wanted to
participate. Interview with Wolf-Dietrich Patermann, Director of Division VI,
Berlin State Chancellery, in Berlin (Feb. 11, 1998).
173.
Korioth, supra note 12, at 1041-42 n.6 (1997).
Id. at 1041-42 n.6
174.
175.
Id.
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by Islamic religious groups in the Turkish language classes, and
the classes are limited to providing information. 17 6 This makes

the arrangement quite different than the standard religious
instruction, which is given by, or under the supervision of,
religious representatives, who may teach religion as the
"truth."1 7 7 Some public schools in Bavaria give information about
Islam in the course of regular instruction, in German but
presumably directed especially at Turkish students. 17 8 In some
parts of Baden-Wfirttemberg, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and
Berlin, religious instruction in Islam is possible in the course of
special Turkish language instruction provided by the diplomatic
1 79
representatives of Turkey.
Although most states seem willing in theory to permit Islamic
instruction on equal footing with Christian classes, two reasons
are universally given to explain why they do not. First, many
argue that Islam lacks the organizational structure necessary to
participate in Germany's system of religious instruction.180 Islam
is a decentralized religion, and some argue it is too decentralized
to satisfy the requirements of "religious community" in Article
Seven, which, this argument goes, includes a better-developed
organization of people with common religious beliefs. 1 8 1 Similarly,
some say that religious "tenets" or "principles" are only possible
when the faith has a fixed content which, in turn, requires
continuity and organization that Islam in Germany is said to
lack.182 Moreover, as the discussion above made clear, states
have complicated administrative procedures governing religious
instruction. 18 3 For example, cooperation in selecting books and
teachers presupposes that someone is in the position to "speak
for" and bind the religious community as a whole. 184
The second claim is that permitting Islamic instruction in the
schools under the control of Islamic leaders could open the door

176.

Wilhelm Rees, Religionsunterrichtin der Schule: Rechtliche Grundlagen

und neure Fragenstellungenaus katholischerSicht [Religious Instruction in Schools:
Legal Foundations and Newer Questionsfrom a Catholic Point of View], 2 KIRCHE
UND RECHT 99, 109 (1996).
177. See supratext accompanying notes 133-34.
178. Korioth, supranote 12, at 1042 n.6.

179.

Id.

180. ECKHARD KLOGEL, NIEDERSACHSISCHES SCHULGESETZ: HANDKOMMENTAR
[SCHOOL LAW OF LOWER SAXONY: WITH COMMENTARY] 300 n.4 (1991); Hollerbach,

Church Work, supranote 155, at 595; Rees, supranote 176, at 110-11.

181.

Joseph Listl, The Development of Civil Ecclesiastic Law in Germany

1994/1995,EUR. J. FOR CHURCH ST. RES. 13, 16-17 (1995).
182. Korioth, supra note 12, at 1047. Islam may be developing more
organizational structure in Germany.

See MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 122, at

180; Rees, supranote 176, at 111 n.52.
183.

See supratext accompanying notes 135-36.

184.

Hollerbach, Church Work, supranote 155, at 617.
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to religion classes that counter the values advanced by the federal
and state constitutions.18 5 Here, commentators point specifically
to the position of women in the Koran, polygamy,1 8 6 parts of the
punishment system in the Koran, the lack of freedom of faith, and
87
the lack of tolerance, or advocation of violence, toward others.
The extent to which Islamic religious instruction actually presents
such dangers is disputed.' 8 8 Often, however, the states
themselves push for religious instruction as a way of integrating
Muslim students into German society, and even as way of
discouraging attendance at private Koran schools, which officials
view as "extremist."18 9 Not surprisingly, some Islamic leaders are
90
suspicious of religious instruction under state auspices. 1
A similar issue arose in West Berlin during the 1980s.
Although Berlin does not have formal religious instruction, it does
make classrooms available to religious groups for this purpose,
albeit without providing any school oversight or involvement. 19 1
Students who do not participate have a free period.' 92 School
officials feared that proposed Protestant instruction leaned too
heavily toward "Liberation Theology" and Marxism. 19 3
Berlin
sought to distinguish between what the state must permit outside
of the schools, which clearly included the right to teach Marxist
views, and what the state must permit inside the schools, which
Berlin argued did not include religion classes that taught Marxist
views. 194
One proposal was to make religious instruction a
regular subject of instruction, as in the other German states, thus
bringing the classes within the control of the state, and (Berlin
hoped) giving the state more power over their content. 195

185.

Mfickl, supranote 148, at 553.

186.

The United States Supreme Court also made this point in 1878 when it

upheld the conviction of a Mormon under a federal law banning polygamy and
reasoned that monogamy was more consistent with democracy than polygamy.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
187. Link, Religionsunterricht,supranote 112, at 502; Rees, supra note 176,
at 111.
188. Mfickl, supra note 148, at 553.
189. Korioth, supra note 12, at 1042.
190. Id
191.
GERHARD EISELT & WOLFGANG HEINRICH, GRUNDRI3 DES SCHULRECHTS IN
BERLIN [OUTLINE OF THE SCHOOL LAW IN BERLIN] 206 (3d ed. 1990).

192. Id.
193. Id. at 209, 215-18 n. 32. School officials claimed that the proposed
instruction ran counter to values such as peace, freedom, the rule of law, and
family values, that it presented East Germany in a positive light and West
Germany in an overwhelmingly negative light, and that it was really an attempt at
political indoctrination under the guise of religious instruction. The syllabus
created conflict within the church and was rewritten. Id. at 217-18 n.32.
194. Id.
195.
Id at 216.
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The conflicts around Islamic religious instruction and
Protestant instruction deemed too close to Marxism, highlight the
problems that accompany the state's use of private religious
institutions for its own ends, particularly the reinforcement of
"values" considered important to the success of democracy.
Although religious groups are free to eschew participation in
religious instruction entirely and are given a large measure of
freedom in determining the content of the courses, the
distinctions that the state seeks to draw among the groups are
potentially in conflict with the characterization of the institution
as a personal religious right, and the Basic Law's general
protection of religious freedom. The American analogy is a public
program that has as its goal the promotion of democracy, and
distinguishes among religious groups on this basis. 196 What are
the permissible grounds for drawing such distinctions? This
remains unclear for us, as well as for Germany.
B. German CorporateBodies under PublicLaw
Awarding to religious groups status as corporate bodies
under public law raises many of the same issues. A 1997
decision by the Federal Administrative Court concluded that
Berlin properly denied the status to a group of Jehovah's
Witnesses. 19 7 Its reasoning is widely seen as a preview of how the
courts will resolve claims by Islamic groups for status as
corporate bodies under public law. 198 The lower administrative
courts held that Berlin was required to award the status to the
Jehovah's Witnesses, 199 a conclusion that has the support of at
least one very influential commentator.2 0 0 The case now goes to

196. This differs from the German cases in that it involves a government
benefit or privilege, while religious instruction, as discussed in this section, is at
least arguably an affirmative "right" against the government.

197. Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprinted
inS0 NJW 2396 (1997).
198.
Gregor Thfising, Kirchenautonomie und Staatsloyalitdt [Church
Autonomy and Loyalty to the State], 51 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 25 (1998). In
1994 two Muslim organizations applied for the status in North Rhine-Westphalia.
Stefan Mfickel, Muslimsiche Gemeinschaften als K6rperschaften des 6ffentlichen
Rechts [Muslim Communities as Corporate Bodies Under Public Law], 48 DIE
OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 311 (1995). Their applications remained unresolved as
of early 1998. See Th-sing, supra,at 25.
199.
Decision of Administrative Court for Berlin, Oct. 25, 1993, reprinted in
13 NVwZ 609 (1994); Decision of Administrative Court of Appeals for Berlin, Dec.
14, 1995, reprintedin 15 NVwZ 478 (1996).
200.
Hermann Weber, K6rperschaftstatusfir die Religionsgemeinschaft der
Zeugen Jehovas in Deutschland? [Corporate Body Status for the Religious
Community of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany?], 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
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the Federal Constitutional Court, and despite some acclaim for
the decision of the Federal Administrative Court, 20 1 it is clear that
202
the Constitutional Court could reach the opposite conclusion.
1. Meaning of the Status "Corporate Body under Public Law"
The history and significance of the status "corporate body
under public law," as well as what entitlements it brings, are
murky at best.203 Indeed, Germans call it a "somewhat puzzling
honorary title"20 4 that "confuses more than it clarifies." 20 s In
general, the status carries with it certain privileges, including two
constitutionally protected rights: the ability to impose taxes on
church members through the state, 20 6 and freedom from
bankruptcy laws. 20 7 Other privileges include that of having
officials that are "public" (although the church pays their salary)
20 8
and who are thus exempt from labor and social security laws;
the power to ground new organizations that also have a special
legal status, such as religious academies; 20 9 the power to publicly
dedicate property and thus bring it within the laws generally
protecting public property;2 10 freedom from many taxes and
12
fees;2 1 '

special

consideration

in

construction

laws;2

representation in certain state organizations such as those that
control radio and television programming;2 13 protection under

EVANGELISCHEs KIRCHENRECHT 172, 173-75 (1996) [hereinafter Corporate Body

Status].
201. Ralf B. Abel, Zeugen Jehovas keine K6rperschaft des 6ffentlichen Rechts
[No CorporateBody Status Under PublicLaw for the Jehovah's Witnesses], 50 NJW
2370 (1997); Thfising, supra note 198, at 29.
202. Thilsing, supranote 198, at 29.

203.

The drafters of the Weimar Constitution disagreed at length about the

meaning and significance of this institution before deciding to explicitly protect it.
HELD, supranote 114, at 21-25. The history of the term and the institution have
been the subject of long-standing disagreement.

ENDROS, supra note 105, at 9-

12, 42-46.
204. Smend, supra note 117, at 9.
205. AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, THE BONN BASIC LAW, supra note 150,
at 167.
206.
WRV art. 137(6).
207.
66 BVerfGE 1 (1983).
208.
AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, THE BONN BASIC LAW, supra note 150,
at 173.
209.
Id.
210.
See Kirchhof, supranote 114, at 672.
211.
AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, THE BONN BASIC LAW, supra note 150,
at 188-89.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.; see also PETER VON TILING, DIE MITWIRKUNG DER KIRCHEN IM
STAATLICHEN BEREICH [THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHURCHES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE] 39-43

(1968).
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state criminal law through inclusion in the definitions of church

officials, church titles, and official clothing; 2 14 and the power to
public administrative functions, such as operating
assume certain
2 15
cemeteries.
The privileges are thus a mixture of those relatively familiar
to the American reader, such as tax exempt status, and those
with no American counterpart, such as the right to representation
in certain areas of local government. According to many, the
most important benefit associated with the status is the increase
in respect that comes through recognition by the state, which
makes it easier, for example, for recognized groups to obtain
credit from banks.2 16 Many of the entitlements have little or no
practical relevance for most religious groups, and having such
status does not obligate a group to take advantage of the
privileges it offers. 2 17 Small religious groups often eschew, for
example, even the power to collect taxes, 21 8 a power that even
some within the two main churches view as less and less of an
2 19
advantage.
The status does not put religious groups on par with other
public corporations such as universities, which are organized and
controlled by the state.2 2 0 Religious groups remain under their
own control, and the status as corporate bodies under public law
22 1
is understood to enhance their independence and autonomy.
As discussed above, commentators defend the status as a
recognition of the role religious groups play in collective life and
community, 22 2 and as means by which the government promotes
institutions that permit people to develop and exercise their
religious views and freedoms. 2 23 The hallmarks of groups that
receive the status include their "care for the collective interests in
public life" and their contribution to the "culture in which political
community is rooted." 22 4 Like religious instruction in the schools,
this status and the privileges it brings assists religious groups in
their contributions to public life.

214. See AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, THE BONN BASIC LAW, supra note
150, at 189.
215. See HELD, supranote 114, at 97.
216. Interview with Rheinholdt Kear, Brandenburg Ministry for Science,
Research and Churches, in Potsdam (Jan. 20, 1998).
217. HELD, supra note 114, at 53-54, 56-57, 62.
218. Id. at 53-54.
219. See Dearest Jesus, supra note 5, at 57; Interview with Patermann,
supranote 172.
220. See HELD, supra note 114, at 27, 32-37.
221. 53 BVerfGE 366, 400 (1980).
222. See Hollerbach, PublicLaw of Churches,supra note 12, at 540.
223. See HELD, supra note 114, at 42.
224. Kirchhof, supranote 114, at 664-65.
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2. Standards for Conferring the Status
The Basic Law incorporates Article 137 of the Weimar
Constitution, which provides in section three that "religious
bodies shall remain corporate bodies under public law insofar as
they have been in the past. Other religious bodies shall be
granted like rights upon application, if the constitution and the
number
of their members
offer
assurance
of their
2 25
permanency."
Religious groups that were corporate bodies under the public
law as of 1919 retained this status under the Weimar
Constitution, and those that had it as of 1949 continue to enjoy it
under the Basic Law.2 26 For example, Prussia awarded the status
in 1875 to the "Old Catholic Church," and this status still applies
in the many states that now comprise what was Prussia,
including Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. 2 27 A variety of Jewish groups
were granted the status before 1919, including the "Israelite
Religious Community of Baden" (1809), the "Israelite Religious
Community of Wfirttemberg
(1912),22s and the "Israelite
Synagogue (Adass Jisroel) of Berlin (1885),229 but were destroyed
during National Socialism.2 3 0 Since 1949, many Jewish groups
have been recognized by various states, along with Mormons,
Christian Scientists, Seventh Day Adventists, the Salvation Army,
and Unitarians. 2 3 ' Although each state makes the decision to
confer the status or not, there is a somewhat formal attempt

225.
226.
227.
228.

WRV art. 137(3).
See GG art. 140; WRV art. 137.
See HELD, supranote 114, at 152-55.
See id. at 149-50 & nn. 1-2.

229.

Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals for Berlin, Feb. 22,

1997, reprintedin 16 NVwZ 396 (1997).
230. The destruction of Jewish communities through the Holocaust and
related emigration has created legal disputes involving the circumstances under
which a group loses its status as a corporate body. In the case of Adass Jisroel,
the state of Berlin agreed that the group now qualified for the status, but
disputed that it had continuing status by virtue of the 1885 conferral by the King
of Prussia. Of 30,000 members, only about 1,000 survived the Holocaust, and
virtually all of those had left Germany by 1945. Between 1945 and 1986, the
Adass Jisroel had no religious community in Berlin.
Id. at 398. The
Administrative Court of Appeals concluded that the 41 years of religious inactivity
in Berlin meant that 1986 was a new group, not simply a continuation of the old
community, and that it therefore did not have corporation status by virtue of the
1885 award. Id. at 399-400. The Federal Administrative Court reversed.
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, Oct. 15, 1997, reprintedin 17 NVwZ
156 (1998).
231. See HELD, supranote 114, at 149-55.

1162

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:1127

among the states to take a unified approach to conferring the
23 2
status.
Until the Jehovah's Witnesses case, the criteria for awarding
the status as a corporate body under public law raised few
problems for the courts and generated little scholarship. 2 33 Only
four cases pressed the issue in court after the Basic Law was
enacted in 1949, and all of them were resolved by determining
whether the groups offered the "assurance of permanency" based
on the number of members and organization of the group.2 3 4 In
three cases, the religious group lost, but in one the court
concluded that the state had erred in denying the status.2 35 None
generated significant controversy.
3. The Jehovah's Witnesses Case
The case brought by the Jehovah's Witnesses against the
state of Berlin raised for the first time serious questions about the
criteria by which states award the status as a corporate body
An organization in Germany since 1897,
under public law.
Jehovah's Witnesses were banned during National Socialism, but
re-organized as an association in September of 1945 in
Magdeburg, in what would become East Germany.2 36 The group
was banned again in 1950, this time by the East German
government, which forbid and made punishable their "every
In 1990-after dissolution of the socialist East
activity."23 7
German government but before reunification with the Federal
"recognized" Jehovah's
Germany
formally
Republic-East

Hermann Weber, Die Verleihung der K6rperschaftsrechte an
232.
Religionsgemeinschaften [The Granting of Corporate Body Rights to Religious
Communities], 34 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 337, 341-42
(1989) [hereinafter GrantingCorporateBody Rights].
233.
Id.at 340.

234. Id. at 342-44. For example, an administrative court in Hannover
upheld the decision to deny the status to an independent Lutheran group that
had fewer than a hundred members until the selection of a new minister, when
the number jumped to 3,000. The group applied for the status just as the
minister planned his retirement, and the court agreed with the state of Lower
Saxony that the group had not demonstrated that it would survive in its current
form. Id. at 342.

235. An administrative court in Bavaria concluded in 1982 that the state
must award the status to a Baptist group with around 3,500 members. In
concluding that the group offered adequate assurances of its permanency, the
court relied in part on the international size and importance of the Baptist
church, to which the Bavarian group belonged. Id. at 343-44.

236.

Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals for Berlin, Dec. 14,

1995, reprintedin 15 NVwZ 478 (1996).
237.
Id.
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Witnesses and lifted the ban on their activities. 23 8 In 1996 the
group reported twenty-nine meeting places and more than eightthousand members in Berlin.2 3 9
Berlin denied Jehovah's
Witnesses status as a corporate body under public law in 1993, a
decision reversed by two administrative courts but eventually
40
reinstated by the Federal Administrative Court in July of 1997.2
The Basic Law requires the award of status as a corporate
body under public law to religious groups whose 'constitution and
number of members offer assurance of their permanency." 2 4 1 The
"number of members" is measured against the population of the
state as a whole, and although commentators mention one-tenth
of one percent, there is no "cut-off" figure. 24 2 Similarly, most
argue that the group must have survived for more than one
generation (about thirty years) but other factors, such as the
strength and age of the group in other states and countries, can
also play a role. 24 3 The word "constitution" in this context is
widely understood to include an organizational structure that
makes it possible for the group to work with the state; it must, for
example, have some sort of administrative structure, offer at least
a measure of financial stability, and have a regular meeting of
members. 244 These criteria help the state evaluate whether the
group will offer the permanency envisioned by the Basic Law, 2 45
but they also ensure that there are representatives who can speak
24
with some authority for the group in its dealings with the state. "
Berlin does not dispute that Jehovah's Witnesses meet these
2 47
standards.
The legal battle centers instead around other requirements
for the status not expressly stated in Section 137.248 Courts and
commentators unanimously conclude that the structure of the

238. Id. at 478-79; see also Weber, CorporateBody Status, supra note 200,
at 173-75.
239.

STATISTISCHES

LANDESAMT

BERLIN,

STATISTISCHES

JAHRBUCH

1997

[STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1997] 194 (1997).
240.
Decision of Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprinted in
50 NJW 2396.
241. WRV art. 137(5).
242.
Weber, Granting CorporateBody Rights, supranote 232, at 355.
243.
Id.
244.
See Kirchhof, supranote 114, at 651.
245.
Decision of Administrative Court of Appeals for Berlin, reprinted in 15
NVwZ at 480 (1996).
246.
Weber, Granting CorporateBody Rights, supranote 232, at 351.
247.
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprinted
in 50 NJW 2396 (1997).

248. The lower courts rejected the claim that the group had received the
status by virtue of its recognition by the transitional East German government in
1990. The Jehovah's Witnesses apparently did not challenge this conclusion
when Berlin appealed the case to the Federal Administrative Court.
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Basic Law implies a further prerequisite 2for
the status:
"rechtstreue" or faithfulness to "law" or "justice." 4 9 Article 9(2) of
the Basic Law, which permits the state to ban "associations,"
including religious organizations whose purposes or activities
conflict with criminal laws or are counter to the constitutional
order, at minimum means that the state need not confer the
status on groups that it may forbid. 25 0 Jehovah's Witnesses did
25
not fall into this category. '
Uncontested too, is that, as part of "rechtstreue," the state
may demand that the religious groups awarded the status will
exercise their administrative powers-in collecting taxes, running
cemeteries, or giving assistance to young people with state money,
for example-in accordance with applicable laws. 2 52 What exactly
this requirement means for an applicant group, however, remains
an open question. Berlin argued that Jehovah's Witnesses did
not clear this hurdle because the organization allegedly practices
a system of "coercion," in part because many of those who "work"
for the organization receive little pay and inadequate health
insurance and retirement pensions, arguably in violation of the

law. 2 5 3

In addition, Berlin argued that the group "isolates"

children and practices corporal punishment. 25 4 The Federal
Administrative Court refused to resolve these issues factually, but
suggested that questions of internal church organization and
discipline do not generally provide the basis for concluding that
the group will not properly exercise its administrative
functions. 25 5 The court reasoned that the line between religious
freedom and autonomy, on the one hand, and the requirements of
the legal order of the state, on the other, was difficult to draw;
that religious groups are not required to conform their own
organizational structure to that of the democratic state; and that
particular points of conflict between the state and a religious
community do not provide the grounds for denying the groups
25 6
status as corporation under public laws.

249.
Christoph Link, Zeugen Jehovas und K6rperschaftstatus [Jehovah's
Witnesses and Corporate Body Status], 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES
KIRCHENRECHT

1,

20-23

(1998)

(accurately

describing

this

conclusion

as

uncontested) [hereinafter Jehovah's Witnesses]. The term "recht" can mean either
"law" or"justice." See CURRIE, supranote 90, at 18-20, 117-21.
250.
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, June 26, 1997, reprinted
in 50 NJW at 2397.
251.
Id. at 2398.
252.
Id.
253.
Link, Jehovah's Witnesses, supranote 249, at 39-53.
254.
Id.
255.
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, reprinted in 50 NJW at
2398.
256.
Id.
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Further requirements based on loyalty to the state are
contested. Some argue that the only permissible limitations are
narrowly construed requirements of loyalty discussed in the
preceding two paragraphs. The Basic Law's protection of religious
freedom, these commentators argue, prevents the states and the
courts from awarding benefits based on their evaluation of the
25 7
teachings and theological merit of applicant religious groups.
Others go as far as to argue that the state may consider the
"diguity" or the "value" of religious groups in awarding the
2 58
status.
The Federal Administrative Court did not directly resolve this
dispute, but suggested that it would give "rechtstreue" at least a
relatively broad reading when it concluded that Jehovah's
Witnesses do not offer the requisite faithfulness to the democratic
state because adherents may not vote. 2 59 Corporation status, the
court reasoned, assists religious organizations where their
2 60
"works" or influences correspond to the interests of the state.
This endeavor demands mutual respect, and the state can expect
that an organization that seeks such status will not call the basis
of the state itself into question. 26 1 Although the court concluded
that Jehovah's Witnesses are positively disposed toward the state
and its laws, the court's decision turned on its finding that
Jehovah's Witnesses reject voting out of principle. 2 62 This, the
court reasoned, puts the group in conflict with the act that
constitutes democracy itself and that lies at the very heart of the
2 63
constitution.
The last paragraph of the opinion makes short work of the
lower court's reasoning that the Basic Law protects, as part of the
guarantee of religious freedom, the right not to vote, and that a
religiously motivated refusal to vote therefore cannot provide the
264
basis for denying status as a corporate body under public law.

257.
Weber, Granting CorporateBody Rights, supranote 232, at 357; HELD,
supranote 114, at 122-24.
258.
Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Neue Religionen irn Abendland [New
Religions in the West], 25 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 135, 168
(1980).
259.
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, 50 NJW at 2398.
260.
Id.

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 2398-99.
264. Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals for Berlin, reprinted in
15 NVwZ 481. Professor Weber also reasons that the status could not be denied
on these grounds. Weber, Corporate Body Status, supra note 200, at 216-18
(arguing that a religiously motivated refusal to vote is protected by Article Four
and cannot provide the grounds for denying the status and that the state may not
evaluate the "quality" of religious groups); see also J6rg Mfiller-Volbehr,
Rechtstreue

und

Staatsloyalitdt:

Voraussetzung filr

die

Verleihung

des
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The Federal Administrative Court responded with an argument
familiar to any American observer: status as a corporation under
public laws, the Court reasoned, is no "necessary result of
religious freedom," but is instead an "advantage conferred by the
state."2 6 s Thus the court appeared to draw a clear distinction
2 6
between "rights" and "privileges," one it has rejected elsewhere,
to explain why its conclusion did not violate the free exercise
rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses. This would present a classic
unconstitutional conditions problem, except that it is unclear in
what sense status as a corporation under public laws is really a
26 7

"privilege."

Furthermore, it is unclear in what sense the
conditions imposed go beyond the parameters of the subsidy

itself, which, after all, has as its overarching goal the promotion of
democracy.2

68

The language of Article 137(5) suggests that the

2 69
state must award the status to groups that meet the criteria,
"27
something other than what we term a "privilege. 0

making it

Instead, there seems to be a conflict between those parts of the
constitution that (arguably) make the status dependent on loyalty
to the state, those that protect such "disloyalty" as part of
religious freedom, and those that guarantee equal treatment of
people with different religious beliefs.
C. The Limits of Private Religious Choice: Democracy
as a Funding Goal
How would we resolve such cases? To some degree the
question makes no sense because in Germany the institutions are
protected by the Basic Law, while in this country the institutions
themselves would be unquestionably unconstitutional, in no

K6rperschaftstatus an Religions und
Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften?
[Faithfulness to Law and Loyalty to the State: Prerequisitesfor the Granting of
CorporateBody Status to Religions and PhilosophicalCommunities?], 50 NJW 3358,
3359 (1997) (criticizing the requirement of loyalty to the state as infringing on the
religious liberties of the group, noting the danger that the status will become
something that only the state's "favorites" receive and arguing that the question of
whether to vote was a religious decision and part of the group's internal structure,
which the court recognized need not be democratic).
265. Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, 50 NJW at 2399.
266.

See CURRIE, supranote 90, 238-40.

267. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989) (doctrine applies to discretionary benefits, not benefits
government is constitutionally obligated to confer).
268. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 694-97 (1992)
(doctrine applies to conditions that exceed scope of the funding).
269. Link, Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 249, at 11; Weber, Corporate
Body Status, supra note 200, at 191-93.
270. See WRV art. 137(5).
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small part because they single out religious groups for special
public treatment, and, in the case of corporation status, they
extend a "status" that goes beyond participation in particular

government programs. To leave it at that, however, misses what
the German cases may offer to the United States, for we also lack
a solution to the puzzle of secular funding goals that profoundly
influence private religious choices and institutions. Thus,
Professor Carter argues on the one hand that the Establishment
Clause should not "disable religious groups from active
involvement in the programs of the welfare state." 27 1 At the same
time, he urges that religions (in the Free Exercise context) need a
"separate sphere from the sphere of state control," 2 72 without
considering how religious participation in public welfare programs
2 73
erodes this "separate sphere."
Imagine, building on dicta in Rust v. Sullivan,2 7 4 that the
United States government set up an organization to fund "local
democracy" in response to right wing violence. The program
would promote "democratic values," "non-violent conflict
resolution," "equality between men and women," and "racial and
religious equality and tolerance." Could religious groups apply for
funding just like the Girl Scouts, local youth groups, and the
Lions Club? Must the program include religious groups, or must
it exclude them, or may it pick and choose among them according
to specified criteria?
Could it include Unitarian Bible study
groups, but exclude comparable Jehovah's Witness groups,
because voting is a basic "democratic value?"
The voluntarist approach has forcefully argued that religious
groups must be included in public welfare programs on the same
terms as secular organizations. 2 75 Inclusion in this situation,
however, seems to undermine, if not betray, the private religious
choice analysis at the heart of this position: participation means
those groups that line up behind a particular version of
"democracy" or "equality" get government goodies. Exclusion from
the program may create an incentive to secularize, but inclusion
creates incentives toward homogenization in religious matters.
How do we evaluate these pressures on private religious choice?
Moreover, the problem is also not primarily one of

271.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supranote 24, at 123.
272.
Carter, The Resurrection?,supranote 47, at 136.
273.
Carter argues that religious communities can provide "resistance to
state authority," that they are "vital transmitters of values," and concludes,
exactly like the Germans, that these functions are "pro-democratic." Id. at 13639.
274.
500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
275.
See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 47, at 35-41; Laycock, Underlying Unity,
supranote 32, at 70-72; McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 183-87.
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unconstitutional conditions, 2 76 which more accurately captures
the difficulties that arise in excluding religious groups from
programs for which they would otherwise qualify27 7 or those that
arise when the government attaches conditions on participation
in public programs beyond simply the goals of the program
itself.2 78
This is a strong example of a problem that all government
funding poses and that is frequently overlooked in the rush to
understand "private" religious choice as the key to the
Establishment Clause. The problem lies in the goals of the
program itself, in the difficulty in deciding what viewpoints the
government may advance, and in how government itself may
speak through its funding power, 2 79 and not in the more narrow
question of including or excluding religious groups, or in
conditions on awarding the funding. As religious groups become
more a part of government welfare programs, those who promote
private religious choice will either have to suggest far greater
limits on government funding generally, conclude that religious
groups must at times be excluded, or accept that government may
profoundly impact private religious choice through secular
funding. Indeed, even "easy" examples pose this problem: funding
soup kitchens encourages religious groups to engage in feeding
the hungry as opposed to other good works. 28 0 For those who see
the provision of such services as integrally connected to religious
beliefs, government programs funding certain social services may
profoundly influence private religious decisions. The point is not
that soup kitchen programs including religious organizations are
unconstitutional, but that they, too, may influence private

religious choice.
The Supreme Court would evaluate the hypothetical
democracy program by considering the "religious" or "sectarian"
character of the organization or the speech.2 8 1 The Establishment

276.

This is so because the condition does not "extend beyond the scope of

the subsidy itself." Cole, supra note 268, at 694-97.
277. Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized
Implicationsfor the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989).
278. See Paulsen, A Funny Thing, supranote 24, at 663-717.
279. The problems of government speech and government-funded private
speech are probably the most intractable of all those presented by the First
Amendment. For discussions of these problems generally, see Cole, supra note
268; and Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
280. Cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 641-42 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that soup kitchens were an easier case for equal access
than issues of teenage sexuality, which are morally and religiously based).
281. Four members of the Court, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and

Ginsburg, would probably rely on the sectarian nature of the organization itself,
see Agostini v. Felton, 51 U.S. 203, 2019-28 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting), while

Justice O'Connor would likely evaluate whether the funded speech itself qualified
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funding

to

"pervasively sectarian" organizations as well as funding for speech

that included "religious indoctrination."2 8 2 Both approaches draw
the line based on the "religiousness" of the organization or the
speech, and would mean that Bible study that also advanced the
equality of men and women would not pass constitutional muster.
Pluralists ask whether the program has a "public purpose -which may include the promotion of "morals"2 3-and whether
the program provides the service(s) for which the government has
granted funds. 28 4 However, pluralists would not invalidate a
program simply because the group integrated "religious beliefs
and practices" into the program, an issue "of no concern to the
2 85
government."
One could argue that the Supreme Court's result is correct
from the perspective of private religious choice because if the
program is "more religious" or "more sectarian," it lies closer to
core religious values, increasing its impact on private religious
choice. But this argument rests on untenable assumptions about
how private religious choice is related to public programs
generally. How would we answer the complaints of a religious
group whose theology had little to do with gender, race, or
violence, but everything to do with performing "good works" in the
community? The government's decision to fund soup kitchens,
this group might argue, profoundly influences its choice to
provide that particular service, a choice that is, or should be, at
base, an uninhibited religious one.
The point of the preceding paragraphs is, in part, that our
intuitions tell us that "democracy" programs (as defined in the
hypothetical above) are constitutionally far more troubling than
soup kitchen programs. Yet, neither the pluralist position, nor
even the underlying concerns with private religious choice, fully
explain our discomfort. The following discussion posits an
explanation for our intuitions based on what Professor Robert
Post has called "public discourse" and the goals that it serves in

as "religious indoctrination," see Bowen, 487 U.S. at 623-24 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). A minority of the Court would reason that the neutral criteria
themselves insulate the program from invalidity under the Establishment Clause.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-53, 858,
862-63 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that neutral criteria is enough
to satisfy the Establishment Clause).
282.
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11, 641 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283.
Esbeck, supra note 47, at 36-37.
284.
Id.
285.
Id. at 36.
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"responsive democracy." 28 6 Although Post has not used these
terms to specifically explore the scope of the Establishment
Clause, 28 7 his discussion of them is helpful in capturing our
concern with the hypothetical democracy program.
Public discourse, as Post describes it, is speech protected by
the First Amendment in which "many types of life, character,
opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed." 2 88
For its part, responsive democracy is more than a majority-rule,
formal democracy; it is a system in which people identify with the
majority's decisions, even if those decisions do not correspond to
their own preferences. Public discourse serves to transform a
formal democracy into a responsive democracy by providing the
basis for reconciling individual autonomy and "collective selfdetermination," or the "general will." 2 89 It does this by presenting
the opportunity to engage in critical dialogue with others, or
through the "running discussion between majority and
minority."2 90 Those whose individual preferences do not become
part of the collective will accept the collective decision as their
own because public discourse gave (and gives) them the
opportunity to convince the majority it was (or is) wrong.2 9 1 To
legitimize democracy in this way, public discourse must provide
the space in which people can transcend and reform the norms of
the community in which they live; 2 92 it is a forward-thinking

286.

This is the subject of the first part of his book.

CONSTITUTIONAL

DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,

See ROBERT C. POST,
1-196 (1995)

MANAGEMENT

[hereinafter POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS].
287.
Post uses these terms to explain why the First Amendment keeps the
government from directly regulating speech through, for example, criminal laws,
or private causes of action that limit speech. He notes that the religion clauses
generally protect personal autonomy, but without exploring how they do so. See
id. at 189. Post similarly describes the Establishment Clause as requiring the

government to be "neutral" among competing versions of religious community, see
Robert C. Post, Community and the FirstAmendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 473, 484
(1997), and remarks that the Establishment Clause limits government speech and
funding, but again without describing precisely where and how, see Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 182 n.164 (1996) [hereinafter Post,
Subsidized Speech].
288.
See POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 286, at 138 (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)). Post takes the term "public
discourse" from Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988). See id. at
273.
289.
See id. at 184-89.
290.
See id. at 185 (quoting HANS KELSON, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
287-88 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961)).
291.
Id.
292.
Limits on public discourse undermine this goal by "excluding those
affected from access to the medium of collective self-determination," and by
cutting off their participation in the "fundamental democratic project" of
reconciling individual and collective will. See id. at 273.
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place, based on the notion of the self as autonomous,
unencumbered, and open to the possibility of communal and
2 93
personal transformation.
Post argues that in the area of government regulation (not
what is at issue in this Article),2 9 4 the First Amendment limits
community norms that are enforced by legal sanction (such as
those enforced by libel and blasphemy laws), creating space for
public discourse where the community itself can be challenged,
criticized, and transformed. Here the power of community to
enforce its own norms must be limited to promote public
discourse.
The success of public discourse in creating a responsive
democracy also, however, depends on community. As Post
explains, the "stability" of "responsive democracy" depends on the
maintenance of appropriate forms of community life. 2 95 Because
community promotes self-determination, engenders the "feeling of
participation" that rests "on an identification with the aspirations
of a culture that attempts to reconcile differences through
deliberative interaction," and enforces rules of "civility and
respect" necessary for successful discourse, both public discourse
and responsive democracy depend on "healthy forms of
2 96
community life."

The success of public discourse and responsive democracy
depends on a certain kind of faith. In order to accept the will of
the majority, even when it conflicts with one's own preferences,
one must believe that public discourse is truly open to views that

293.

See id. at 188.

294. At issue here is the government's power, through subsidies to private
groups, to fund particular goals, such as soup kitchens or better democracy, in
part by advancing a particular "message" or speech (e.g., "voting is good") through
those groups. Post explores part of this problem in Subsidized Speech, where he
reasons that the limits on the government's power to control subsidized speech in
the domain of public discourse depends on whether the government's actions are
characterized as "conduct rules," directly regulating public speech, or "decision
rules," guiding internal government operations in order to achieve a particular
objective. Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 287, at 180. Conduct rules, but
not decision rules, must clear the high hurdles imposed on all direct government
regulation of speech, including viewpoint neutrality. See id. at 180-84. Decision
rules are generally only limited by how "the government can organize itself to
intervene in public discourse" so as to promote the particular value in question.
See id at 181. Post suggests that there are few such limits on decision rules, or
on the government's power to "exemplify and advance particular community
values." See id. at 184-92. The question explored in the above discussion is what
limits the Establishment Clause places on this power, and the point is that the
answer comes not just from personal autonomy, but also from the tension
between democracy and community that Post describes.
295.

See POST,

CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,

(footnotes omitted).
296. See id. at 192-93.

supra note

286,

at 189-90
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one seeks to advance. A truly responsive democracy, in which
constituents hold as legitimate the outcome of the political
process, depends on their sense that the government has not

shaped the space of public discourse in advance, or "fixed" the
game.
This need for faith helps capture our intuitions about the

hypothetical democracy program. Although the government is
continually shaping public discourse around prevailing
community norms, the difficulty arises when it does so in a way
that shakes our faith in public discourse; it is our perception that
government direction fixes the game that matters. The democracy
program threatens public discourse in this way because it seeks
to reform individuals before they enter into public debate, rather
than just adding its own opinion. While we can counter, perhaps
with difficulty, the government's explicit message in public
discourse, (e.g., a public service message "Go to the polls and
vote, it's the right thing to do"), it is harder to counter deeply
embedded private opinions that less obviously spring from, or are
shaped by, government influence. The hypothetical democracy
program seems to shape public discourse in this way.
Moreover, the democracy program does not just shape
individuals (and through them the public discourse), it shapes
them around a particular vision of public discourse. The attempt
to put some things in the "democracy" box and to keep other
things out is easily understood as a way of honing our
sensibilities to say that certain things fall beyond the legitimate
scope of democratic public discourse. Moving things off the table
of public discourse in this way may facilitate or appear to
facilitate particular outcomes to the detriment of those with other
views; public discourse, as a result, may seem less "fair."
Finally, where the government draws these lines based on
race and gender, it intrudes on public discourse where it can least
afford to do so. Issues of race and gender seem central to our
personal identity; as such they are especially resistant to
reconciliation with the collective will. If we think that the
government has manipulated people around its vision of gender
and race in order to promote a particular national community, the
critical ingredient needed to bridge the distance between personal
and collective decisions is missing: faith that public discourse
truly gives us the opportunity to convince others of our view.
This last point seems to simply lead us back to the issue of
private religious choice by suggesting that a program that impacts

deeply held personal

or private values

(the hypothetical

democracy program) is more suspect than one that does not (the
soup kitchen). What shakes our faith in responsive democracy,

however, is related not solely, and perhaps not even largely, to
whether individual autonomy is implicated in what the
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government does. Instead, faith in public discourse depends on
our perception of whether the legitimacy of public discourse is
threatened. Aid to soup kitchens may involve political debate,
and may also shape individuals' views, including their private
religious choices. Still, winners and losers alike understand the
result as legitimate, as a decision to fund soup kitchens. The
"losers" in the democracy program debate, however, understand
the government's funding as making their efforts to be heard in
public discourse more difficult, and hence they are less likely to
accept the majority's decisions as their own. If some claim that
the soup kitchen program is central to their autonomy, we cannot
refute that claim as a matter of personal autonomy, but we do say
that the government had neither the intent nor the effect of
reshaping public discourse.
Germany draws this line differently. It seeks to ensure public
discourse by fostering what Post explicitly says community must
provide for responsive democracy to work: personal autonomy,
the desire to reconcile that autonomy with the collective will, and
the "civility and respect" necessary to successfully engage in
public discourse. 2 9 7 We protect autonomy and the integrity of
private religious institutions in order to preserve public discourse.
Germany, on the other hand, gives the government more latitude
to build community and shape public discourse, even if this
imposes some limits on private institutions. The point is that in
this context our notion of private religious choice is not
freestanding, but is instead tied to the success of responsive
democracy, precisely the goal that Germany pursues.
Similar issues arise in the discussion of government religious
speech below.
Government religious speech distorts private
religious choice by influencing the listener in favor of the views
advanced by the speech, and participation in the creation of
government speech gives religious groups the opportunity to
compromise and agree on religious speech different from what
they would engage in privately. Prohibiting government religious
speech, on the other hand, means that the first amendment
aggressively requires a different sort of collective community
building, one that distorts heavily in favor of the secular. The
flaws in the private choice analysis are the same here. Without at
least some grounding in how the political system should function,
"private choice" provides us with little reference point just when
the issues become particularly difficult.

297.
The similarities to republican political theory are clear. See SANDEL,
supranote 48, at 5-7, 25-28; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and is
it Worth Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1695, 1700-01, 1715-18 (1989).
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V. RELIGIOUS SPEECH BY THE GOVERNMENT

The complicated relationship between private religious choice
and government religious speech is the subject of this section.
Here the term "government religious speech" means speech by
government officials or private speech attributable to the
government by virtue of the government's control over the content
or setting of the speech, as well as speech that has kept some or
all of its religious meaning.2 98 "Government religious speech"
does not include speech solely about religion, such as a history
class that includes the Reformation, or a literature class that
2 99
or speech that has become almost
includes Goethe's Faust,
entirely secular in meaning, i.e., the name of the city of "Santa

Monica." There is, of course, no clear line between secular and
religious speech, and both the German Federal Constitutional
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have embarrassed themselves
trying to draw one. 30 0 This difficulty is an important subtext in
the discussion that follows, but the discussion begins with a
somewhat different question: what is the relationship between
private religious choice and the religious (as opposed to the
secular) aspects of government speech?
A. German Cases
traditionally
resolved
The Constitutional Court has
government religious speech cases almost entirely on what we
would term free exercise grounds. The institutions discussed in
the foregoing section sharply undercut any argument that the
prohibition of a state church in the Basic Law means that
government and religion must remain "separate." Both religious
instruction and status as a corporate body under public law
require close and ongoing cooperation between the state and the
religious groups involved, and both are explicitly protected by the

298. This would include, for example, school-initiated Bible readings during
school hours, in which students select and read the passages, see Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1963), or prayers during a graduation
ceremony read and written by a private speaker at the request and under the
direction of school officials, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
299. Such speech is constitutional in both countries. See Illinois ex rel
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; Martin Heckel, Das Kreuz im 6ffentlichen Raum. Zum
'Kruzifi-Beschlu,6" des Bundesverfassungsgerichts[The Cross in Public Spaces. On

the Federal Constitutional Court's aCrucfix DecisionJ, 111

DEUTSCHES

VERWALTUNGSBLATT 453, 456 (1996).
300. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685-86, 692-93 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), 709-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 35273.
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Basic Law. With the tools of separation largely unavailable to it,
the Constitutional Court has relied on the impact of religious
speech on personal autonomy to gauge its compatibility with the
Basic Law, 3 0 at least until the Classroom Crucifix decision in
1995.302
The reliance on individual autonomy has produced three
limitations on government religious speech; all three are of

growing significance to the United States, as both the Supreme
Court and scholars seek to understand the Establishment Clause
not in terms of separation, but in terms of private religious
choice. Coercion is the easiest limitation based on personal
autonomy, and both countries now face virtually identical
problems in defiming what exactly falls into this category. Second,
some government speech that cannot be termed coercive, but that
does favor or endorse religion, violates the Basic Law. In the
United States, as in Germany, the courts have had trouble
pinpointing exactly how to categorize and evaluate such speech
based on personal autonomy.
Finally, the German courts insist that government religious
speech can promote religious liberties by giving religion space to
unfold in public areas over which the state has a great deal of
control, principally the public schools. 30 3 This is how the Federal
Constitutional Court usually justifies government religious
speech. It does not rely, in other words, on the state's power over
education as a justification for the "religious" elements of religious
speech, such as school prayer. It does rely on this justification
for religious speech that has a largely secular meaning, but
religious speech itself is justified primarily4 by reference to the
30
liberties of the government's constituents.
Although this argument sounds unfamiliar, it is advanced in
the United States as well. 30 5 In a slightly different form, it is used
to both attack the model of separation as inconsistent with the
state's obligation to neutrality and to support the proposition that
government religious speech should correspond to the actual
religious practices of individuals.3 0 6 In contrast to arguments

made in the United States, however, German courts have
reasoned that the political process, which stands in some tension
with individual autonomy, determines how religious views get
reflected into the public sphere. This tension leads the German
courts to look to how the political process should function to

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See generally CURRIE, supranote 90, at 249-50.
93 BVerfGE 1.
See infra text accompanying notes 312-51.
See Heckel, supranote 299, at 456.
See infra text accompanying notes 404-16.
See infra text accompanying notes 86-89, 404-16.
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maximize religious autonomy when government speech is at
issue. The local nature of constitutional adjudication that this
model suggests, and its goal of promoting "compromises" that
best correspond to the preferences of everyone is, however, foreign
to United States jurisprudence. Before addressing these three
limitations, however, the German cases themselves and the
conflicts that they have generated are discussed in the following
section.
1. Interdenominational School Cases
A trio of 1975 decisions upholding the school systems in
Baden-Wfirttemberg, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia
illustrate the Constitutional Court's traditional approach to
government religious speech, particularly in the schools.3 0 7 In
the first two cases, plaintiffs challenged the compulsory public
schools as too religious. 30 8 The schools were explicitly based on
Christian values, included Christian symbols in the classrooms
and school prayer, required that music classes include Christian
songs, and had curricula based on Christianity but "open" to
other world-views.3 0 9 The schools were not "confessional," that is
they were not aligned with one particular Christian tradition, and
religious instruction itself was conducted in separate, voluntary
classes divided by confession.3 1 0 The third case involved similar
interdenominational schools, but the challenge came from
confessional
parents who wanted their children to attend public
31
schools, i.e., Catholic or Protestant public schools.
The Constitutional Court upheld the school systems in all
three states. The court first reasoned that Article 6(2)(1) of the
Basic Law,3 12 which gives parents control over the upbringing of
their children, does not give parents the right to select the form of
the local public school.3 1 3 Instead, the court held that the Basic

307.

See 41 BVerfGE 29 (1975) translatedand reprintedin partin DONALD P.

KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

OF

GERMANY 467-70 (2d ed. 1997); 41 BVerfGE 65 (1975); 41 BVerfGE 88
(Interdenominational School Cases).
308. 41 BVerfGE 29; 41 BVerfGE 65.
309. See 41 BVerfGE at 38-39.
310.
Seeid.at4l.
311. Historically, many German states had public schools divided by
confession. In these cases, consolidation for the purpose of increasing the quality
of education had led to larger schools designed for children of all religious faiths.
See 41 BVerfGE at 91, see also Lark E. Alloway, Comment, The Crucifix Case:
Germany's Everson v. Board of Education?, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 361, 381-83
(1997).
312. "The care and upbringing of children is a natural right of and duty
primarily incumbent upon the parents." GG art. 6(2)(1).
313. 41 BVerfGE at 49.
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Law leaves the formation of public schools to the political process
in the individual states.3 14 The court also explained, however,
that the Basic Law's guarantee of religious freedom provides not
just an individual defensive right against the state, but also a
positive guarantee of room for the active confirmation and
development of personal convictions.3 1 5 The court did consider
parents' decision to keep their children free from religious
influences a negative freedom, protected by Article Four of the
Basic Law. However, the negative freedom conflicted with the
positive demands of parents who wanted a religious education for
their children, equally protected by Article Four of the Basic Law.
In short, in an area over which the state has a great deal of
control, such as the schools, the Basic Law protects both types of
3 16
rights equally.
This "positive" freedom to choose a religious education is the
fulcrum on which the first two opinions turn. By characterizing
parents' wish for a Christian education as a "freedom," the court
transformed the conflict into one between two groups of
individuals exercising their rights, away from a conflict between
the state on one side and the individuals on the other. 3 17 Having
characterized the dispute as a conflict between competing
constitutional rights of individuals-those parents seeking
religious education and those rejecting it-the court reasoned that
no arrangement could fully vindicate both interests. 31 8 Instead,
the court reasoned that the obligation to resolve this tension falls
3 19
to lawmakers, who should seek a compromise acceptable to all.
Neither positive nor negative rights had priority, the court
reasoned, and a solution must be based on tolerance.3 2 0 In

seeking a "middle course," however, the court reasoned that
states could consider their religious
make-up of the state's
residents,
321
religious convictions.
The court also found several
Specifically, the court held that

314
315.

Id.
Id.

316.

See id.

traditions, the confessional
and the strength of their
limits on majority power.
states could not create

317. As one leading commentator explained in reference to the school
prayer cases: the question is whether the individual right to refuse to engage in
religious practices can also be the basis for the right to make all of the other
students stop praying. See Roman Herzog, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 4
[Commentary on Article 4 of the Basic Law], in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, supra
note 126, § 4, at 25.
318.
41 BVerfGE at 50-51.
319.
Id.
320.
Id.
321.
Id.
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"missionary" schools and must avoid coercion.3 22 The schools in
question met these standards, the court concluded. 3 23 The court
also found that religious influence on the curriculum, outside of
religion classes themselves, simply recognized the influence of
Christianity on western history without advancing the Christian
faith as "true."32 4 Finally, the court noted that state law directed
that the views of all students must be tolerated and accepted and
3 2S
that no student could be isolated based on his religion.
The third school case made clear that Article Four's positive
freedom does not include the right to demand that public schools
include particular religious values or traditions.3 2 6 The court
rejected a challenge from parents who wanted North RhineWestphalia to keep its system of confessional public schools,
reasoning that the positive religious freedom of such parents was
simply one interest that the state must consider when arriving at
a solution that best meets the needs of everyone involved. 3 27 In
this case, the court noted, the schools in question included
religious instruction, and state law required both that the
confessional affiliation of the students be taken into consideration
when selecting a teacher, and that instruction comport with
Christian cultural values.3 28 On this basis, the court concluded
that public officials had adequately considered the interests of
32 9
parents who wished for confessional education.
These cases illustrate the Federal Constitutional Court's
rejection of the "secular" as "neutral," at least in the context of
public schools. Denying the government latitude to engage in
religious speech in areas of pervasive government control, the
court reasoned, improperly refuses religion a place in public life:
"Removing all ideological and religious references from the school
would not resolve the ideological conflict, but would disadvantage
those who desire a Christian education for their children and
would compel them to send their children to a lay school that
33 0
largely corresponds to the plaintiffs world view."
The court also relied on a strong notion of free exercise rights
that includes the "positive freedom" to advance one's religious

322. Id. at 52.
323. Id.
324. See id.at 52, 64.
325. The court recognized that individual teachers and schools might not
respect these limits in practice, and noted that the court remained open to other
complaints on these grounds. The question here was whether the entire system
was facially invalid. Id. at 64.
326. See 41 BVerfGE 88.
327. Id. at 95, 107.
328. Id. at 109.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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views in the school. 3 3 ' This somewhat unfamiliar "freedom" is not
easily labeled as either a "positive" or a "negative" constitutional
right. 33 2
The court unambiguously stated that Article Four
contains not just an individual "defensive right" (Abwehrrecht)
against the state, but also requires that the state secure room for
the active confirmation and development of religious convictions,
particularly where the state has assumed responsibility for a
particular area of life. 3 3 3 The court reasoned, however, that this
"freedom" finds its vindication to a very large degree through the
political process. 3 3 4
In other words, religious speech that
advances religious preferences of constituents has a particular
legitimacy against the claim that it violates the rights of others to
avoid contact with that speech. The government's obligation,
however, extends only to considering the religious interests of
everyone and to looking for _a solution that best balances the
rights of all.
The court also justified the Christian basis of the elementary
schools on grounds more familiar to the American reader. First,
it emphasized the historical basis of the practice, not so much as

a guide to original intent, 33 5 but as an explanation for why

religion from the school could not count as
eliminating
3 36

"neutral."
The court pointed out that schools were historically
divided by confession, that religion has always played an
important role in education, and that the public schools are

compulsory.3 3 7

The court also mentioned the cultural and

331.
Seeid. at49.
332.
See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 864, (1986).
333.
41 BVerfGE at 49.
334.
Id. The institution of religious instruction, on the other hand, is
protected by the Basic Law, and the institution itself is not at the mercy of
lawmakers except in Berlin, Bremen, and perhaps Brandenburg, although
lawmakers in all states regulate the details of how religious instruction is
administered.
335.
In general, both in religion cases and elsewhere, the subjective
intentions of the Basic Law's framers play an understated role in deciding cases.
Instead, the courts tend to use history to look for the purpose of the provision in
connection with both its text and the Basic Law's structure. KOMMERS, supra note
307, at 42-43.
336.
41 BVerfGE at 64.
337.
The courts have rejected the claim that parents have a constitutional
right to home-schooling of their children, based on either their rights as parents
(Article 6(2)) or their religious liberties (Article 4). See Administrative Court for
Munich, March 16, 1992, reprintedin 11 NVWZ 1224 (1992). The Basic Law does
protect private schools in Article Seven, but subjects them to rigorous conditions,
and permits private elementary schools only if they serve "a special pedagogic
interest," or are religious schools of a "type' not offered by the public systems.
Article 7(5). On the other hand, the court has held that the government must
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historical significance of the Christian faith, reasoning that "the
affirmation of Christianity refers primarily to the recognition of its
influence on culture and education, not to the truth of the faith,
and is therefore in this sense justified-also against nonChristians-through the history of western culture. " 33 8 The court
used the point to explain that the curricular influences of
Christianity on the public schools came within the state's
legitimate educational goals.
2. School Prayer
The court relied heavily on the reasoning of the
Interdenominational School Cases when it resolved the difficult
issue of voluntary school prayer in 1979. 33 9
The state
Constitutional Court in Hesse 3 4 ° struck down a voluntary prayer
on the grounds that to excuse oneself from the prayer required
students to reveal their religious convictions in violation of Article
136(3) of the Weimar Constitution 4 1 (incorporated into the Basic
Law by Article 140),342 and that permitting the student to enter
the class after completion of the prayer did not give the students
an acceptable way of excusing themselves. 3 4a In short, the state
court found the formally voluntary prayer coercive.
The Federal Constitutional Court described the nondenominational, Christian prayers in question as religious
exercises evoking God that went beyond the recognition of religion
as a cultural or educational force. 3 44 Nonetheless, the court
found the prayers brought two basic rights into conflict, and
reasoned that to insist on excluding such prayers from public
schools would give absolute priority to negative religious freedoms
3 45
over the positive freedoms of those who wanted the prayers.
Rejecting the lower court's conclusion that the prayers were
coercive, the court reasoned that the right to not reveal one's
religious convictions did not take precedence over the rights of

subsidize certain private schools, because otherwise the right to establish them
would have little value. See CURRIE, supranote 90, at 287-88.
338. See 41 BVerfGE at 64.
339. See 52 BVerfGE 223 (The School Prayer Case), translated in part in
KOMMERS, supranote 307, at 461-66.
340. The court consolidated the case from Hesse with one from North
Rhine-Westphalia in which the Federal Administrative Court, reversing two lower
administrative courts, held similar prayers constitutional. Id. at 224-32.
341. "No one shall be bound to disclose his religious convictions." WRV art.
136(3).
342.
343.
344.
345.

See 52
See id.
See id.
See id.

BVerfGE 223.
at 226.
at 238, 240.
at 241.
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others to practice their religious beliefs. 3 46 Moreover, the court
pointed out, the Basic Law itself created situations, particularly
the refusal to bear arms, 3 47 in which those who seek exemptions
3 48
must similarly reveal something of their religious convictions.
The court went on to note that in exceptional cases particularly
sensitive students in unsympathetic schools might mean that the
school must forego the prayers, but this did not justify the lower
court's conclusion that any and all such prayers were
unconstitutional. 3 49
The court made clear that the positive
freedoms involved did not compel schools to institute prayers. 3 s °
The court also relied on Article 7(1), which provides that "the

entire educational system shall be under the supervision of the
state," to explain why the schools may lead such prayers over the
objections of some students and teachers. 35 ' Article (7)(1), the
court reasoned, gives the states authority over the schools
independent of individual educational goals of parents. The rights
of parents and states are equal; neither takes automatic
precedence. 35 2
The court ultimately, however, justified state
power in relation to parents' wishes: "If the state permits school
prayer in interdenominational schools, it does nothing other than
exercise its [rights granted in Article 7] in a way that permits
students who want to, to acknowledge their religious faith, if only
in the limited form of a generally designed ecumenical invocation
of God."3 53
In other words, the court linked the power of the school to
include prayers to the religious preferences of students and
parents; it did not justify religious exercises based on the state's
own educational goals.
3. Crosses and Crucifixes in Courtrooms and Classrooms
The court's reasoning shifted substantially in 1995 when it
struck down a Bavarian law directing that public school

346. See id. at 239. The court did not distinguish between situations in
which students, as opposed to the school, led or initiated the prayer, concluding
that in either case the prayers passed constitutional muster.
347. Article 4(3) of the Basic Law provides that "[n]o one may be compelled
against his conscience to render military service involving the use of arms. Details
shall be regulated by federal statute."
348.
52 BVerfGE at 241.
349.
Id. at 241-42.
350.
See id. at 242.

351.
352.
44).
353.

Id. at 242 (citing GG art. 7(1)).
Id. at 236 (citing Interdenominational School Cases, 41 BVerfGE 29,
Id. at 241.
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classrooms include a cross. 3 54 Two students and their parents
objected to the presence of a crucifix 35 5 in their classrooms,

especially the depiction of a "dying male body."3 5 6 This particular
case involved large crucifixes-eighty centimeters in length, with
a sixty centimeter figure of Christ-placed on a table at the front
of the classroom, in clear sight.3 5 7 The parents agreed to a
compromise in which a smaller cross instead of a crucifix was
placed over the door.358 The school eventually refused, however,

to make similar adjustments in all of the classrooms in which the
children received lessons, or to guarantee that it would continue
to make any adjustments in the future. 3 S9 The parents and
students sued and the Constitutional Court declared the law
360
unconstitutional.
In explaining how the court reached its decision, I begin with
the dissent. The dissent emphasized that the Basic Law gives the
states control over education,3 6 1 and that the Bavarian
Constitution provides that children in the public schools shall be
educated on the basis of the Christian religion. 3 6 2 The dissent
reasoned that the government may use symbols important to
private religious practices in the state in order to create a space
which corresponds to the religious convictions of a large number
of students and their parents. 3 6 3 This secures the space for
individuals to actively confirm their convictions, and hence

354.
See 93 BVerfGE 1 (The Classroom Crucifix Case), translated in part in
KOMMERS, supranote 307, at 472-83.
355. Although the state law used the word "cross," it made no mention of
the size, appearance, or placement of classroom crosses. See id. at 2. This
particular case involved a crucifix, but the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional
Court explicitly included both crucifixes and crosses. The Author accordingly
uses the word cross in reference to the state law and crucifix in reference to this
particular case. In discussing the Court's opinion, the Author uses the term
cross, the word the Court used.
356.
Id. at 2.
357.
Id.
358.
Id.
359.
See id. at 3.
360.
Id. at 1.
361.
Id. at 27 (dissenting opinion).
362.
"Die 6ffentlichen Volksschulen sind gemeinsame Schulen ffir alle
volksschulpflichtigen Kinder. In ilnen werden die Schler nach den Grunds&tzen
der christlichen Bekenntisse unterrichtet und erzogen." ["The public elementary
schools are common schools for all children who are required to go to school. In
these schools, pupils are instructed and raised according to the principles of
Christian beliefs."] 93 BVerfGE at 27 (dissenting opinion) (quoting BAVARIAN
CONST. art. 135). Moreover, as we have seen, the Federal Constitutional Court
upheld this form of public school in 1975. See supra text accompanying notes
307-38.
363.
93 BVerfGE at 29-30 (dissenting opinion).
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promotes religious practices and freedom.3 64 The dissent
considered the crosses non-coercive because they required no
active affirmation from the students, who could think as they
wished about them without excusing themselves from the
3 6s
classroom.
Moreover, the dissent reasoned that the crosses do not bring
"missionary" influences into the classroom because they simply
correspond to the values of the people in Bavaria itself.3 6 6 The
dissent pointed out that life in Bavaria involves continual
confrontation with crosses-on paths and roadways, in hotels,
restaurants, hospitals, retirement centers, and private homes, for
example-and under these circumstances a cross in the
classroom corresponds to everyday life and has no missionary
character.3 67 Finally, the dissent emphasized, the cross serves
not just as religious symbol, but also as a symbol for the
influence of Christianity on western culture. 3 68 The dissent thus
relied on the control of the state over education, the cultural
importance of the cross, and its potential to advance the religious
freedoms of individuals to conclude that the crucifix did not
violate the Basic Law.
The majority retreated a significant step from its earlier
emphasis on positive religious freedoms in the school.3 6 9 The
court relied instead on the structural requirements of "neutrality,"
the religious meaning of the cross, and its impact on students, in
ruling the law unconstitutional. 3 70 The court began by
distinguishing sharply between the exercise of religious beliefs by
the government and private religious expression, a point that
strikes at the heart of the positive freedom to express one's views
through the government. 3 71 The court reasoned that the
placement of crosses violated the Basic Law's requirement of
"neutrality" because the cross symbolizes Christianity and
represents, among other things, the martyrdom of Christ and
Christ's victory over Satan and death. 3 72 For non-Christians, the
court concluded, the cross represented the missionary character
of the Christian faith, and in the context of the classroom
presented the Christian faith as exemplary and worthy of

364.
365.
366.
367.

See id. at 30 (dissenting opinion).
Id.
See id. at 33 (dissenting opinion).
See i.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See id. at 32-33 (dissenting opinion).
See supratext at notes 313-34.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
at 19.
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emulation. 3 73 While not completely clear on this point, the court
seemed to conclude that the cross was also coercive when it
emphasized that students must confront it for long periods of
time with no way of excusing themselves, distinguishing this
situation from the School Prayer Case. 3 74 Although the court still
nominally considered the conflict as one between positive and
negative freedoms, it rejected the claim that the positive religious
freedom of some parents and students justified the cross. The
court concluded that the law-makers had not reached an
acceptable compromise because they completely disregarded other
views and permitted Christian students to receive instruction
"under" the symbol of their faith.3

75

The court also distinguished an earlier case in which it held
that the state must remove a crucifix from its courtroom at the
request of a Jewish litigant and her Jewish lawyer, but refused to
hold that all such crucifixes violated the Basic Law. 3 7 6 In the
earlier case, the court reasoned that in many situations the cross
might correspond to the beliefs of everyone in the courtroom,
making it constitutionally unobjectionable. 3 77 The 1995 court
distinguished the case on the grounds that schools, unlike

courtrooms, involve both particularly impressionable students
and long-term, repeated exposure to the religious symbol. 3 78 The
two opinions nevertheless stand in some tension, in no small part
because the 1995 decision suggests rather powerfully that all
crosses put up by the state violate the Basic Law, while the earlier
3 79
case explicitly reasoned otherwise.
The court's decision in the Classroom Crucifix Case met with
intense criticism. Chancellor Kohl deemed the decision
"incomprehensible,"38 0 a judgment shared by more than a few
commentators. 3 8 ' A former President of the Federal Constitutional
Court called the decision a "bad mistake."3 8 2 Prominent Bavarian
politicians and elected officials called for officials to disregard the

373.

Id. at 20.

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.
See id. at 24.
See 35 BVerfGE 366 (The Courtroom Crucifix Case).
Id. at 375.
93 BVerfGE at 18, 20.
See Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the Crucifix Decision, supranote

107, at 459-60.
380.
See KOMMERS, supranote 307, at 482.
381.
Prominent examples include Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the
Crucifix Decision, supra note 107, at 449; Ernst Benda, Wirkliche
Gtterddmmerungin Karisruhe?[Real Twilight of the Gods in Karlsruhe?, 48 NJW
2470 (1995); Heckel, supranote 299, at 456.
382.
See Benda, supranote 381, at 2470.
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court's ruling, 3 83 fueling claims that the opinion harmed the
reputation of the court and tested the faithfulness of the people to
the rule of law (Rechtstreue).3 84
The Constitutional Court
responded, remarkably, with a "clarification."38s The court stated
that the head notes for the opinion might be misleading and that
it held unconstitutional only the state-ordered placement of the
cross in the classroom.3 8 6 The correction of head notes is of little
help, one commentator noted, when their content is repeated by
the court's reasoning, which supports only the conclusion that all
3 87
crosses in classrooms are unconstitutional.
Scholars have trained their criticism on four problems with
the Classroom Crucifix Opinion in addition to its "incoherence."
First, the court made a significant break with its earlier decisions,
without acknowledging or defending the change.3 8 8 Second, the
court unnecessarily resolved an entire class of cases, and its
reasoning suggested that all classroom crosses must come down,
even though the court could have simply struck down the law in
question on the far narrower grounds that it provided no
mechanism by which the state could consider removing the cross
in individual cases. 3 8 9 Third, the court's conclusion that the law

violated the state's obligation to neutrality rested on dubious,
sweeping statements about the "meaning" of the cross, a
3 90
theological matter over which the court has no authority.
Finally, the court intruded on matters that the Basic Law
intentionally left to the states in order that they might consider
local religious beliefs and history in resolving conflicts around
39 1
religious influences in the public schools.
Bavaria responded to the court's decision with a new law in
December of 1995.392 The new law draws substantially from a

383.
Das Kreuz ist der Nerv [The Cross is the Nerve], DER SPIEGEL, no. 33,
1995, at 22-23.
384.
See Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the Crucifix Decision, supra note
107, at 449 (quoting Stem, Die Fehler der Richter [The Mistakes of the Judges],
312 DIE POLITISCHE MEINUNG 5 (1995)).

385.
386.

Id.
See id.

387.
See id.
388.
See id. at 457-60; Heckel, supranote 299, at 456, 458-59.
389.
See Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the Crucifix Decision, supra note
107, at 454.
390.
See id. at 453-54, 460-62; Heckel, supranote 299, at 456, 465-66.
391.
See Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On the Crucifix Decision,supra note
107, at 455-57; Karl-Hermann K&stner, Lemen unter dem Kreuz [Learning Under
the Cross], 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 241, 266-71 (1996).
392. For legislative history see Gerhard Czermak, Das bayerische KruzfixGesetz und die Entscheidung des BayVerfGH vom 1.8.1997 [The BavarianCrucifix
Law and the decision of the Bavarian Constitutional Court of August 1, 1997], 51
DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 107 (1998). The law passed by a vote of 97 to 68.
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report commissioned by the state of Bavaria and written by Peter
3 93
Badura, former president of the Federal Constitutional Court.
Like the old law, the new one provides for crosses in Bavarian
classrooms. 3 94 Under the new law, however, if parents object to
the cross based on honest and "visible" or expressible principles
of their faith or world view, then the school must seek a
compromise.3 95 If it finds no compromise, then the school must
create a rule for each individual case that respects the freedom of
the complainant and the religious views of everyone in the
class. 3 96
In that decision the school must consider, to the
greatest degree possible, the desires of the majority.3 9 7 The new
law, according to Badura, stays within the "Spielraum" or "room
for play" afforded to the states by the Basic Law and
39 8
Constitutional Court's 1995 decision.
The Bavarian Constitutional Court upheld the law in August
of 1997. 3 99 Considering largely the question of whether the new
law violated the Bavarian State Constitution, the court reasoned
that the law had two legitimate purposes: recognizing the
historical and cultural importance of Christianity and promoting

the religious expression of those who wanted crucifixes in the
classroom. 4 0° The court distinguished the law from the one ruled
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court on the
grounds that the new law explicitly provided a way for students
40 1
and parents who objected to the cross to request its removal.
So far, the Federal Constitutional Court has refused to consider,

Christian Social Union members voted for it; the Social Democrats, with one
exception, and the Green Party members voted against it. Id. at 109.
393. The report is reprinted in full in 1996 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLATTER
33.
394. Czermak, supranote 392, at 107.
395. "Wird die Anbringung des Kreuzes aus emsthaften und einsehbaren
Grfinden
des
Glaubens
oder
der
Weltanschauung
durch
die
Erziehungsberechtigten wiedersprochen, versucht der Schulleiter eine gaitliche
Einigung." See Czermak, supra note 392, at 107. The phrase "emsthaften und
einsehbaren," imperfectly translated as "honest and expressible," is frequently
used by the courts to explain the burden on those seeking exemptions from
generally applicable laws. The phrase was used by the Constitutional Court in
the Courtroom Crucifix Case to describe the burden on litigants who sought
removal of the cross. 35 BVerfGE 366, 376.
396. Czermak, supra note 392, at 107.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 108.
399. See Decision of the Bavarian Constitutional Court, August 1, 1997,

reprintedin 50 NJW 3157 (1997).
400.
401.

I& at3158-59.
Id. at 3162.
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4 °2
complaints challenging the new Bavarian law.
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B. The Limits of Private Religious Choice Reasoning:
Government Religious Speech
The pluralist position has not, as discussed in Part II, given a
clear answer to the problems posed by government religious
speech. 40 3 The German cases point to problems with pluralist
arguments that the government should engage in no religious
speech and that the government speech should "mirror" private
religious
choice,
and
to
difficulties
in understanding
proselytization from a private choice perspective. To this it adds
the perspective that government religious speech can itself
advance private religious choice by reflecting not merely the
practices, but also the preferences of private constituents.
Building on this reasoning, the courts have developed a normative
view of how the political process should function in creating
government religious speech.
This section begins with a
discussion
of private
religious
choice,
coercion,
and
proselytization in German and American cases, and concludes
with a discussion of constituent preferences and private religious
choice.
The goal of the discussion in this section is to explain how
the United States and Germany are drawing closer in their
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; to make clear the limits of
private religious choice analysis in understanding proselytization
and in arguing that government speech should "mirror" private
choice; and to note the correspondence between the German
emphasis on local decision-making and the proposals of the some
Establishment Clause scholars in the United States. Although
the last part of this section offers something of a "defense" for the
German system, it does so as way of illustrating weaknesses in
the U.S. system, not as suggestion that any particular cases
should be decided differently, or that the United States should
adopt any wholesale version of the German jurisprudence.
1. Coercion
Coercion emerged as a key component of government speech
cases as the Supreme Court retreated from separation, based in

402.

See Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, December 4, 1997,

reprintedin 17 NVwZ 156 (1998) (refusing to consider the merits of the challenge);
see also Czermak, supranote 392, at 114.
403.
See supraPart If.
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part on the reasoning that the private religious lives of the people
made a government that could engage in no religious speech
overly hostile to religion. 4° 4 American courts long accepted this
point in contexts like the military, where the government itself
may take some religious action, like hiring chaplains, in order to
meet the free exercise needs of the people over whom it has a
great deal of control. 4° s In 1963, Justice Stewart argued in
Schempp that this argument extends to schools as well: "a
compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life
that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity
in the schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created
disadvantage. "40s Like the Germans, Stewart emphasized the
government's control over the public space. Stewart reasoned
that even if the Free Exercise Clause did not require the
government's actions, those actions "mak[e] possible the free
exercise of religion," insulating them from Establishment Clause
4 °7
claims unless they qualify as coercive.
Justice Stewart's opinion garnered not one additional vote in
Schempp,4°8 and as long as the separationist position of the
Schempp majority prevailed, government religious speech had
little formal, constitutional relationship to private religious
convictions. Instead, the Court upheld such speech based on
historical practice, 40 9 the secular meaning of the speech, 4 10 and
41 1
the government's secular goals in engaging in the speech.
4 12
Others have thoroughly criticized this logic elsewhere.
Important here is that none of these inquiries has much to do
with private religious institutions or private religious choice, and
all contain biases toward historically dominant religions (read

404. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657-58
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
405. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S 203, 226 n.10, 299
(Brennan, J., concurring) (1962).
406. Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Schempp held unconstitutional
state laws requiring reading from the Bible in public schools but permitting
students to excuse themselves. See id. at 205-27.
407. Id. at 316 (Stewart, J, dissenting).
408.

See id. at 308.

409.

See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663 (1989) (Kennedy,

J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-78 (1983); Marsh v.

Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983).
410. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444
(1961).
411.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 717 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 693
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

412. See Epstein, supra note 61, at 2154-71; William Van Alstyne, Trends in
the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v.
Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L. J. 770; Wallace, supranote 24, at 1202-23.
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Christianity) and serve to legitimate speech that derives from
those religious traditions.
Justice Kennedy, however, revived a version of Justice
Stewart's argument in Allegheny, reasoning that the powerful
presence of government makes an entirely secular public sphere
non-neutral.4 13 This was an extension of Stewart's more limited,
4 14
but otherwise similar point in the context of public schools.
Justice Kennedy also reached the same conclusion: the
constitutional problem arises not so much from the government's
speech, but from the potential coercion of those forced to
listen. 415 While Justice Stewart seemed concerned with policing
the correspondence between the speech of the government and
the wishes of the community, Justice Kennedy left this process
4 16
largely to the majority.
The focus on coercion in Allegheny mustered a majority of the
Court four years later in Lee v. Weisman,4 17 moving American
reasoning, at least temporarily, a significant step toward
Germany's, where school prayer cases have revolved largely
around the issue of coercion. 41 8 The majorities in Engel and
Schempp, on the other hand, did not reach the coercion question,
concluding instead that government involvement in the speech
made it unconstitutional, whether or not it was coercive. 4 19 The
replacement of Justice White by Justice Ginsburg has likely
shifted the Court away from coercion, toward a more restrictive
approach. 4 20
Disagreement over exactly what constitutes coercion is
remarkably similar in the two countries. The School Prayer cases
in Germany, for example, asked what threat or pressure makes

413.
414.
415.
416.

See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.

417. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The five Justices who agreed on
the coercion test did not agree on its application to the commencement prayer at
issue.
418. See text accompanying supra notes 339-53.
419. See supranote 64 (discussing Engel). The Schempp majority focused
on the government's role in drafting the prayer, not on whether the opportunity to
excuse oneself made the setting non-coercive. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-26.
Stewart, dissenting, argued that coercion was the appropriate inquiry. See id. at
313.
420. Justice Ginsburg wrote a short dissent in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinnette and joined Justice Souter's dissent in Rosenberger v.

Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. 753, 817-18
(suggesting that the goal of the Establishment Clause is "to uncouple government
from church," and reasoning that a Ku Klux Klan cross displayed in a public
forum near the Ohio state capitol violated the Clause); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819,

863-99 (joining Justice Souter's dissent).
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the situation created by the government unconstitutional. 42 1 This
is one of the issues that divided Justices Kennedy and Scalia in
Weisman.4 2 2 In both countries, some conclude that indirect
pressure to conform one's behavior, such as social pressure to
stand during the prayer or the necessity of disclosing one's
religious beliefs in order to ask to be excused, 4 23 make the
decision to participate in a commencement or other school prayer
Others conclude that only
unconstitutionally constrained. 42 4
more direct pressures make the practice unconstitutional. 4 25 The
Classroom Crucifix Case presented the other side of the problem:
while the state clearly pressured (under threat of legal sanction)
students to attend schools with crosses in the classrooms, the
Federal Constitutional Court disagreed as to whether the
observation of the crucifix amounted to "coercion." The dissent
reasoned that only forced participation, or affirmation of the
4 26
speech or symbol, could create a true conflict of conscience,
while the majority held that the "appellative" character of the
cross and its symbolic statement that Christianity is worthy of
emulation made it unconstitutional. 42 7 Weisman raised this
Justice Kennedy suggested that coerced
problem as well.
attendance did not make the situation objectionable, but pressure
to participate did. 4 28 It is fair to say that whether coercion was
involved in Weisman, what its nature was, and if and why it
rendered the prayer unconstitutional, remains a much-debated
42 9
question.

421. See supra text accompanying notes 339-53.
422. For a discussion of this problem in Weisman, see Paulsen, Lemon is
Dead, supranote 24, at 847-48.
423. Professor Paulsen argues, just as the lower courts in the school prayer
cases reasoned, that the requirement of revealing at least something of one's
religious beliefs is inherent in asking to be excused and makes religious exercises
in the schools unconstitutionally coercive. Id. at 847-48.
424. See 52 BVerfGE at 233, 245-46 (describing the decision of the lower
court in Hesse).
425. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-43 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
426. See 93 BVerfGE at 33 (dissenting opinion).
427. See id. at 20.
428. 505 U.S. at 592-93.
429. See Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 24, at 825-43; see, e.g.,
Richard S. Myers, A Comment on the Death of Lemon, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
903, 905-06 (1993) (reasoning that the Weisman prayer was not a worship
service); Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 24, at 828-31 (concluding that
Weisman involved coerced attendance at a religious worship service); Wallace,
supra note 24, at 1263 n.379 (suggesting that Weisman involved coerced
attendance at, but not participation in, a prayer that does not qualify as a
worship service). Justice Kennedy reasoned that the coercion was to participatein

the prayer, but had trouble showing that participation in the prayer, rather than
just attendance at an event during which the prayer was recited, was subject to
enough pressure from the state to qualify as a coerced decision.
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2. Proselytization
Missionary speech, or "proselytizing," in a non-coercive
context, presents a more difficult question from the perspective of
private religious choice. On the one hand, listeners are free to
reject the message of the speech, and may be free to abstain
entirely from listening or observing. On the other hand, avoiding
government religious speech has its cost.
If coercion only
includes forced participation or affirmation, situations arise in
which people are pressured to hear or see government speech,
even if they are not forced to affirm it. The dissent in the
Classroom Crucifix Case reasoned that it might reject government
speech if, and to the extent that, the government goes beyond the
religious symbols prevalent in the community.4 0 That is, where
a pluralistic community continually displays only one type of
religious symbol, it is likely that the government's motives are
improper-it seeks not to reflect private choices, but to advance
one religion and manipulate private choices in favor of it. Or,
stated another way, the process has been subject to majority
capture. The dissent in the Classroom Crucifix Case responded to
this concern when it insisted that crucifixes are not the product
of government manipulation, but instead of the background
culture in Bavaria.4 1 This corresponds neatly to McConnell's
point that if government speech mirrors private religious
practices, is has not distorted private religious preferences. 43 2 The
problem remains, however, of the listener who does not agree with
the speech, even if the speech accurately reflects private religious

practices.
Some reason that government speech "endorsing" a
particular religious viewpoint suggests that those not sharing that
viewpoint are not as welcome in the process of government. This
forms the core of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, which
asks whether the challenged practice "endorses" religion or nonreligion from the perspective of an "objective observer."4 3s The
problems with this test, with respect to the goal of protecting
private religious choice, include an anti-religious bias that
suggests that little or no religious speech is appropriate, 4 34 and

430.
93 BVerfGE at 30 (dissenting opinion).
431. Id.
432.
McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 193.
433.
CapitolSquare Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-83
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).

434. See Epstein, supra note 61, at 2137-54 (reasoning, under the
endorsement test, that virtually all forms of "ceremonial deism" including
government religious holidays such as Christmas, violate the Establishment
Clause); McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 152-54 (arguing, inter alia, that
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the lack of a coherent approach to accommodation of private
religious practices, which may well appear to "endorse
religion."43S

The German Classroom Crucifix Case raises another issue for
listener-based concerns: how do we analyze government religious
speech with which all taxpayers and listeners agree? 436 Public
furor arose around the Federal Constitutional Court's reasoning
that crosses in classrooms violate the state's obligation to
"neutrality," because this reasoning suggested rather powerfully
that all such crosses must come down, whether or not students
or parents object.4 3 7

By relying on "neutrality," the Court

retreated from an approach based purely on conflicting individual
rights, perhaps due to the difficulties in explaining exactly why
individual liberties of
and when non-coercive speech violates the
4 38
observers who do not object to the speech.
Protection of individual autonomy alone does not require
prohibiting government religious speech until someone who
Protection of political
disagrees with it is forced to listen.
autonomy does, however, require this limit. Religious speech by
the government that "advocates" one religion tends to make

the endorsement test is applied against government endorsement of religion but
never against government disapproval of religion because in the former case, the
religious practice in question is readily apparent, but in the latter case, it is
hidden by secular alternation practices).
435. For a discussion of this and many other problems with the test,
including its indeterminacy, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and

Doctrinal !llusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86
MICH. L. REv. 266, 276-309 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, Symbols].
436. This sounds like an entirely academic question, because the courts
will not be faced with cases in which no one objects to the speech. Nonetheless, it
has profound impact on what the courts' rulings mean in practice. If crosses are
only unconstitutional when someone objects to them, Bavarian officials will likely
only remove them when such an objection is lodged. Consider, too, the case of
Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), in which a principal required
a teacher to remove a Bible from the top of his desk and two religious books from
the library, although it appears that neither parents nor students actually
objected to them. The principal believed instead that the Constitution required
her actions. See Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 497 (1996) [hereinafter, Smith, Unprincipled ReligiousFreedom].
437. Czermak, supra note 392, at 108; Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, On
the Crucifix Decision, supranote 107, at 449.
438. McConnell argues that the government may not proselytize because a)
"the state has far superior means by which to advocate its view of spiritual truth,"
b) "those means are supplied by the citizens through other coercive powers
including taxation," and c) "the state is limited to performing those functions
authorized by the people, and there is no reason to suppose that a religiously
pluralistic people . . . would entrust the function of religious instruction to
political authorities." McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 24, at 162. The second
two reasons do not apply to this hypothetical, and the first seems to simply give
more force to the second and third.
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challenge and dissent more difficult, and tacitly endorses one
religious perspective as more "normal." Members of a
homogeneous community, one could hypothesize, may have this
as their private, religiously motivated goal: they want to make
personal change more difficult because they believe that they
have arrived at the truth. As a matter of personal autonomy,
such speech need not be limited by the Establishment Clause;
after all, individuals in the community can change their mind, or
opt for different speech. Political autonomy does require this
limitation: public space must remain open to change, even if
interests of personal autonomy do not compel this result. The
Establishment Clause limits proselytizing because where the
government's own opinions on religious truth and values are
strong, the problem of creating public space available to challenge
those opinions is too great.439
The German cases build on the importance of political
autonomy by considering in part how the process of forming

government speech should function, relying to some extent on

local and case-specific factors. 440 By asking if the objection was
based on "honest" and "expressible" reasons, for example, the
Federal Constitutional Court easily credited the objection of a
Jewish plaintiff in the Courtroom Crucifix case, but did not
resolve the issue for all plaintiffs. 44 1 In the United States, even
Justice O'Connor, who focuses on the problems of exclusion from
government, relies on the perspective of an "objective observer,"
and asks how the speech would impact a hypothetical, welleducated, constitutionally literate observer, not how it impacts
the people actually involved in the litigation. 442 The following
section discusses the normative view of the political process in
the German cases and its emphasis on local and case-specific
issues.
3.
Government
Preferences

Religious

Speech

Based

on

Constituent

The German cases justify government speech in part based
on its relationship to private constituent practices. The dissent in

439. Justice O'Connor makes this point when she reasons that
endorsement sends a "message" to "adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 687-88 (1984).
440.
See infra text accompanying notes 453-56.
441. 35 BVerfGE 366.
442.
Capitol SquareReview & Advisory Bd. v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-73
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Smith, Symbols, supra note 435, at 294-45
(arguing that the "objective observer" undermines the goal of preventing the

government from sending messages of exclusion because the controlling standard
is not "the actual perceptions of real citizens").
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the Classroom Crucifix Case, for example, emphasized
ubiquity of crosses in Bavaria and reasoned that education

the

is an area in which the dealings of the state and the freedom of
citizens meet. In such an area the government may use
meaningful symbols, which are frequently used in that particular
state, to create an organizational space in which a large percentage
of the students and their parents can realize their religious
44
convictions. 3

The majority made the same point in the Interdenominational
School Cases: "State law makers can consider the fact that the
majority of the state's citizens belong to a Christian church. They
are not denied the power to maintain the greatest possible
correspondence
between school and home in religious
4
matters." "
This emphasis on correspondence between private and public
religion recalls McConnell's insistence that government religious
speech should avoid distorting private religion practices in
precisely this way. 445
As the following section discusses,
Germans have also, however, translated the theoretical niceties of
speech that correspond to private religious practice into some
insights as to how private preferences get translated into
government religious speech. Professor McConnell, on the other
hand, largely kicks this translation back to the political process,
with no proposal for how that process should work. 446 Indeed,
the German normative reliance on compromise through the
political process rejects a fundamental tenet of McConnell's
approach to private religious choice: compromise tends to create
homogenous speech reminiscent of a "civil religion" that mirrors
no actual religious practices. 44 7 McConnell's rejection of this
approach represents weakness in a pure private religious choice
approach to government religious speech; it provides a theoretical
answer that democracy cannot produce, and it does not recognize
participation in government as legitimate private religious choice.
By focusing on individual interests and the process of
translating preferences into government speech, the German
cases offer a glimpse of a locally-based approach to such speech
that corresponds to some efforts at Establishment Clause reform
in the United States. First, however, a cautionary note: this next
section builds on how the German courts reason, but it goes
For example, the Federal
beyond what they have held.
between
looks for
correspondence
Constitutional Court

443.
444.

See 93 BVerfGE at 30 (dissenting opinion).
41 BVerfGE at 60.

445.
446.
447.

See supratext accompanying note 78.
See supratext accompanying notes 86-89.
McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 168-69, 175, 190, 193.
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government and private religious speech, but while in the cases
this has largely justified religious speech, a lack of
correspondence has never provided a basis for barring
government religious speech.
Moreover, the German cases
considered here, with the sole exception of the Courtroom Crucifix
case, all involve public schools.
The analysis that follows
suggests that this reasoning could apply outside of this context,

and thus moves significantly beyond what the German cases have
held.
(a) Localized Constitutional Adjudication
If government religious speech is justified by the "people's
religious institutions," it follows that differences in these
institutions may mean differences in the constitutionality of the
government's speech. After concluding that the form of the school
is left up to the state, the Constitutional Court reasoned in the
Interdenominational School Cases that "depending on the
confession or world-view of the relevant parents it might be the
case that states could not establish certain of the [otherwise
permissible] forms of the school, or could not do so without
ensuring sufficient alternatives to the normal form of the
4 48
schools."
Similarly, the dissent in the Classroom Crucifix Case
emphasized that the Christian basis of the public schools was the
result of a popular vote in Bavaria, that most of the citizens in the
state belong to a Christian church, and that it was fair to assume
that even some people not associated with the churches would
still respect the symbol. 44 9 Moreover, the dissent pointed out that
the symbol in question was one prevalent in private religious life
in Bavaria. 45 0 Even commentators critical of the court's decision
reason that a crucifix in a class of primarily Islamic students, in
the state of Bavaria where the crosses are otherwise permissible,
451
would not pass constitutional muster.
Justice Stewart made a similar point in Schempp when he
considered whether the school board would permit local
variations on the Bible readings if selected, if parents so

requested. 45 2 Justice Stewart reasoned that Government action
must

not "weight the scales

of private

choice,"

and that

448.
41 BVerfGE at 48.
449.
93 BVerfGE at 28 (dissenting opinion).
450.
Id.
451.
Stefan Mfickel, Oberkreuz mit dem Kreuz [At Cross Purposes with the
Cross], 2 KIRCHE UND RECHT, supranote 153, at 65, 80.
452.
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 315 (1963) (Stewart, J.,

dissenting).
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government initiated religious exercises do not "weight" such
choice "if they simply reflect the differences which exist in the
society from which the school draws its pupils."4 3 Flexibility by
local school boards in the face of community requests strengthens
the argument that the Bible readings only reflect that community,
but if local school boards or state law "prohibit local schools from
substituting a different set of readings where parents requested

such a change," then the practices
less likely result from, or
45 4

conform to, community preferences.
As a result of this type of reasoning, constitutional
adjudication is more localized and context-specific in Germany
than in the United States. In the Courtroom Crucifix Case, for
example, the Federal Constitutional Court required the removal of
4 55
a crucifix from the courtroom at the request of Jewish litigants.
However, it did not hold all such crucifixes unconstitutional,
noting that in many cases they correspond to the views of
everyone involved. 45 6
Similarly, the court upheld voluntary
school prayer, but did not rule out that under certain
circumstances such prayer could be unconstitutionally coercive,
4 57
depending, in part, on the religious make-up of the class.
Public schools based on Christianity might be unconstitutional,
the court suggested, when the constituents' religious beliefs did
not justify them.4 5 8 On the other hand, certain practices-such
as non-voluntary school prayer-remain off-limits under brightline rules not subject to local changes.
Our jurisprudence does not do this: Bible reading, school
prayer, released time programs, and prayers at the beginning of
commencement addresses, it tells us, are either constitutional or
unconstitutional in their particular form everywhere, regardless of
the presence or lack of an objection, the basis or strength of that
objection, or the how the make-up of the community speaks for or
against such government actions. 45 9 As Justice Kennedy stated
in Weisman, in discussing the state's role in selecting and
composing the commencement prayer: "A school official, the
principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction should be
given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a
constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that

453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
501.

Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
35 BVerfGE at 366.
Id.
See 52 BVerfGE at 252-53.
See 41 BVerfGE at 48.
See, e.g., Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, supra note 436, at
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the prayers must occur."4 6 0 In Germany exactly this difference
may make Bavaria's new law permitting crosses in classrooms
constitutional, while the old law requiring such a cross was
unconstitutional. 4 6 1

In the United States, Professor Steven Smith has advocated
judicial reasoning along the German lines based on his argument
4 62
that no one principle can satisfactorily resolve religion cases.
Smith attacks "principles" because they mean that what is valid
for a school board in Louisiana must also be valid in
Massachusetts, raising the stakes of constitutional adjudication
and raising the passion and alienation that results from a
decision. 4 63 If the courts and constitutional scholars in the
America have "undermined the ability of communities and
institutions to work out acceptable accommodation for competing
religious and secular concerns,"4 64 as Smith argues, then the
German courts may give an example of how courts could promote
such an ability. 4 65 Indeed, Smith's suggestions about how local
officials might consider such programs often bring to mind the
Smith suggests that local
reasoning of the German courts.
officials can reach "compromises" in "good faith" that achieve
some sort of accommodation, 46 6 recalling the German emphasis
on consensus building discussed in the following section. Smith's
optimistic

hope

that

such

compromises

could

provide

the

460. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
461. The room for local officials to remove the cross when faced with
objections is the main difference between the old and the new laws. Some argue
that this difference is not enough to make the new law constitutional. See
Czermak, supra note 392, at 109-13.
462. Smith, UnprincipledReligiousFreedom, supranote 436, at 498.
463. Seeid.at501.
464. See id. at 515.
465. The crucifix issue provides a potential example. Consider a law like
the one now in place in Bavaria. Imagine that the practice is to use small crosses
over the door, rather than at the front of the classroom. The traditional German
approach to this problem permits concrete factors to resolve the constitutionality
of the cross in each case: what is the basis of the objection? How did school
authorities address the objection; what are the possibilities for compromise?

What is the risk that the dissenting students will be singled out (this may mean
that the size of the majority cuts the other way)? May other students request that
the school display other religious symbols? Why did the school refuse to remove
the cross when confronted with the objection? Perhaps under such a calculus
some crosses would be acceptable, whether in inner city or rural southern
schools, and perhaps many or all would have to come down when students or
parents objected.
Such an approach may make the issue far less divisive, and it certainly gives
a far different guidance for how local officials should resolve disputes. The
standard to which the courts hold local officials is that of a reasonable
compromise under the circumstances at hand, not determining if, and who, has a
"right"that must trump others.
466. Smith, UnprincipledReligious Freedom, supranote 436, at 502.
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occasion to teach about "religious commitment, religious
diversity, and tolerance,"467 is virtually identical to the Federal
Constitutional Court's reasoning that permitting the public
schools to have a Christian basis, but requiring toleration and
acceptance of all religions, could give everyone the opportunity to
468
learn to respect the freedoms of others.
(b) Consideration of all Viewpoints
The German courts make explicit that any decision by the
government in this area must consider the rights of all, and must
operate from the basic principle of tolerance. 46 9 In describing the
obligation of law-makers, the Federal Constitutional Court
explained that "[tjo solve the inevitable tension between positive
and negative religious freedoms in the schools, the democratic
law-makers are obligated in forming public policy to seek a
tolerable compromise for everyone with consideration of the
various views." 4 70

In this balancing process, the court has said,

the government cannot simply give negative or positive demands
automatic priority. 4 7 1

This approach, although it may sound hopelessly "squishy"
and standard-less to an American observer, particularly as an
inquiry by the courts, may help to answer some of the objections
to government religious speech, particularly on the local level.
Professor Karst has written, for example, that "[1]eaving decisions
about official symbols of religion to 'communities' means leaving
them to politics.
With negligible exceptions, local Christian
majorities need not bargain at all in order to display the symbols
4 72
of their own religion."
The German reasoning provides a powerful incentive to
bargain: compromise with, and consideration of, minority views
can help insure that the practice passes muster under the Basic
Law. Moreover, concrete factors help determine whether local
officials have truly sought a compromise. Coercive practices,
situations in which it is difficult to excuse oneself, or situations in
which access to the public space in question is granted to only
one type of religious speech despite requests by others for
inclusion, all suggest a lack of concern with minority religious
speech. The point is not that these factors are novel, but that the

467.

Id

468.

See 41 BVerfGE at 64.

469.
470.

See id.
See id. at 50.

471.

41 BVerfGE at 49.

472.

Karst, supra note 76, at 526.
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German approach grounds them in a normative view of how local
decision-making should function.
One might object to this sort of reasoning on the grounds
that it is too "transparent," and that the Supreme Court loses
legitimacy because it relies on factors that are both local and
more contested, failing to preserve "the Court's appearance of
neutrality." 47 3 In this situation, the link between opacity and
legitimacy is not clear as a factual matter. The Classroom
Crucifix Case, which appeared to eschew balancing individual
interests in favor of a bright-line rule that said all crosses in all
schools were unconstitutional, seriously undermined the Federal
Constitutional Court's legitimacy. The cases in which the courts
routinely balance religious objections against the interests of the
state have created no such problems. In the United States,
"bright-line" cases like Employment Div. v. Smith 47 4 and those
abolishing school prayer have not added to the Court's popular
legitimacy. 4 75 This suggests that some opaque rules, those that
pretend to equate what we know is different (i.e., possible Jewish
and Catholic objections to crosses in Germany), also threaten the
47 6
Court's "institutional position."
One might take a different tack and say that when it comes
to government religious speech, a bright-line no-speech rule
better protects minority interests than a more flexible
approach. 4 7 7
A flexible approach, which involves weighing
competing claims to public space, puts the courts in the business

473.

Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism,94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 1448

(1996).
474. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a partial list of articles critical of Smith see
Lupu, supranote 29, at 251 n.162.
475. The decisions striking down school prayer may have the general
support of the scholarly community, but they have probably detracted from the
Court's popular legitimacy. See GARY L. McDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE LIMITs OF JUDICIAL POWER 155-57 (1988).

476.
Lessig, supra note 473, at 1449. Lessig discusses the Courts' own
perception of what threatens its legitimacy, which is a different question than
what threatens that legitimacy in the eyes of scholars or the general public.
477. Another objection is that a decentralized system always puts
dissenters in the position of having to raise an objection. This is true, and it
speaks for some global rules. The question of burdens, however, is a tricky one.
Even a simple invitation to bring religious symbols into the classroom puts a

unique burden on students of minority or unpopular religions, who must forego

their symbols (and risk ridicule) or bring their symbols with them (and run the
same risk). Even if the state operates no public schools, however, the burden is
particularly great on minority religions with few members, who will incur more

expense to form their own schools. A state that has public schools with no trace
of religion may cause conflicts for minority religious students who disagree with
what is taught, or who may not go to the prom or watch films. Minority religions
will always have a particular burden to seek exemptions from a culture based on
other religious traditions.
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of evaluating the strength of religious convictions and may open
the door to discrimination by the courts against minority religious
claims. A related argument is often made in the United States
4 78
against legislative or judicial accommodation of religion.
In Germany, the Basic Law's aggressive protection of free
exercise rights requires a wide variety of religious exemptions
from generally applicable laws, 47 9 and law-makers have provided
additional exemptions and accommodations for religiously
motivated conduct. 48 0 Those seeking an exemption must show
that the requirements of their faith prevent their fulfilling the
legal obligation in question, and that they would be forced into a
conflict of conscience if forced to do what the law requires. 4 8 1 The
courts require a concrete, substantial, and "objectively
demonstrable" presentation of the religious duty, which weeds out
frivolous requests or those actually based on non-religious
grounds. 48 2 The individual's interests are weighed against the
interests of the state in enforcing the rule or law.4 8 3 Applying this
test, the courts have required schools, for example, to exempt
twelve and thirteen-year-old Muslim girls from co-ed physical
education classes at the request of their parents, who claimed in
part that the clothing worn by girls in the presence of boys
violated their faith. 48 4 The court rejected the school's emphasis

478. See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 386-400 (1989);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the
Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 733-38 (1992).
479. See CURRIE, supranote 90, at 255-66 (reviewing a number of decisions
by the Constitutional Court requiring exemptions from generally applicable laws).
The courts have also refused to permit exemptions, including a number of claims
by Muslims for exemptions from the law requiring anesthetization of animals
before slaughter. State Court in Hamm, February 27, 1992, reprinted in 30
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN KIRCHENSACHEN (KirchE 93 (1997); Administrative Court of
Hamburg, September 9, 1989, reprinted in 27 KirchE 246 (1994).
An
administrative court in Bavaria rejected a mother's claim that her religion
required exemption of her daughter from swimming lessons in the public schools.
The school's interest took precedence, the court reasoned, because although the
plaintiff referred to the Bible, she advanced only very general arguments that
wearing bathing suits is "immoral" and "sinful." The court found these
explanations not sufficiently objective or demonstrable. Administrative Court, of
Bavaria, Apr. 8, 1992, reprintedin 30 KirchE 189 (1997).
480. Laws governing the slaughter of animals provide for religious
exceptions, see § 4a Abs. 2 Nr. 2 TierSchG 1986, and prisons must make it
possible for prisoners to follow the eating requirements of their faith. § 21
StVollzG.
481. Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, August 25, 1993,
reprintedin 31 KirchE 328, 334 (1997).
482. Id.

483.

Id.

484. The Federal Administrative Court granted relief to two different
plaintiffs in very similar cases on August 25, 1993. Id. at 328, 341.
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on the importance of physical education because the plaintiffs
48 5
agreed to participate in single-sex physical education classes,
and credited the plaintiffs' claims that less restrictive measures,
such as wearing different clothing during the classes, would not
resolve their conflict of conscience. 4 6 The court also reasoned
that to require participation in sports in clothing not well-suited
48 7
for that purpose would put the students at a disadvantage.
These cases suggest that the German courts seem generally
open to the claims of minority religious adherents, 48 8 perhaps
answering in part the concern that courts will have troubling
"seeing" burdens that are less familiar to them. The courts do not
and cannot fully answer this concern, but Smith, which retreated
to a bright-line rule to the substantial detriment of minority
religious interests, suggests the dangers in over-emphasizing the
courts' difficulties in evaluating claims of religious faith or
obligation.
(c) Greater Access to Government Speech

Another way of evaluating whether government religious
speech advances the religious beliefs of constituents is by
considering the extent to which access to comparable speech is,
or can be, extended to others. The dissent in the Classroom
Crucifix Case made this point when it suggested that if a student
sought comparable access to another religious symbol, the
schools should honor that request (although the school could
deny the request to restore the crucifix entirely). In the United
States, both Professor McConnell and Justice Kennedy raise the
issue of access, albeit in somewhat different ways. Professor
McConnell suggests this access as a remedy for those who
complain about government religious speech. 48 9 Justice Kennedy

485.
486.
487.

Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.

488.

Nonetheless, the danger that minority religious adherents will have

more difficulty establishing the sincerity of their views deserves consideration, as

a series of cases concerning the apparel of teachers in public schools proves. A
court in Munich upheld a school's requirement that a teacher stop wearing in
class the colors that he claimed his religion requires: "sunrise red," or "red mixed
with orange and violet." Decision of the Administrative Court for Munich, Sept. 9,
1985, reprintedin 5 NVWZ 405 (1986). The court's reasoning, in light of the case
law above, can only be described as disingenuous: the government, the court
insisted, must remain entirely neutral on the issue of religion, hence teachers
cannot wear attire that "advertises" their religion. When the teacher pointed out
that the schools were, by law, Christian in basis, suggesting that the government
was not strictly neutral, the court responded that reliance on this argument was
not available because the plaintiff was not Christian.
489. See McConnell, Crossroads,supranote 24, at 193.
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would use access as way of evaluating whether the government
intended to advanceL one religion over others; if this was the
government's intent, his remedy would apparently be the
traditional one advanced by the Supreme Court, removal of the
4 90
symbol.
This returns us to Professor Karst who argues that symbolic
speech by the government has a particular capacity to polarize
political debate because "[symbols] are not the subject of
49 1
multilateral negotiation and they do not invite compromise."
Instead, "they present yes/no questions that offer no middle
ground."49 2 But some government speech does become open to
compromise and middle ground. If difficulty in finding a middle
ground is the key problem with government religious speech,
there are more direct ways to address it than preventing such
speech entirely.
As candidates for permissible government religious speech,
Professor Karst suggests the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance, and the phrase "In God we Trust" on money; 4 9 3 both
offer far less middle ground than the religious speech he so
opposes, such as local display of religious holiday symbols.

Perhaps the religious speech Karst would permit, like "In God we
Trust," is less divisive or controversial than that which he argues
against, like holiday displays. But ruling holiday displays flat-out
unconstitutional seems to offer no cure for divisiveness,
particularly if local government is free to keep putting up displays
in the hope of coming within whatever rationale Karst would have
us use to support the other, constitutional, religious speech, such
as "In God We Trust." Beyond this, however, even putting an
entire area beyond the reach of local politics offers no guarantee
4 94
of political peace, as the school prayer cases well illustrate.
The assumption that religious speech by the government is
divisive not only tends to entail the premature assumption that
the alternative is less divisive, it also ignores potentially better
methods of reducing polarization along religious lines. An
advantage of promoting comparable access to government speech

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989).
Karst, supranote 76, at 508.
1&
Id- at 520-21.
See SANDEL, supra note 48, at 64 (remarking that "[a] Court concerned

above all to avoid social discord might reasonably have decided [the school prayer
cases] the other way"). Others have thoroughly criticized divisiveness as a tool for
the courts (a point which Karst partially accepts), see Edward M. Gaffney, Political
DivisivenessAlong Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History
and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980), and the Court has largely

abandoned this analysis, see, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987).
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is that it tends to make the government speech itself less unique,
less contested. If the response to a Christmas display is that
other groups may use the same space for a Buddhist display, the
government endorsement of the one display loses its uniqueness,
and hence, perhaps, its divisiveness.
It also forces religious

majorities to consider their own reaction when symbols of other
religions become part of government speech.
4. Non-Traditional Religious Majorities in Germany
One interesting potential advantage of the German approach
is the possibility that it avoids an explicit bias toward historically
powerful religions. It does include a bias toward religious views
currently present in the community, and something of a bias
toward the majority religion in a community.
However, the
religious group that this approach favors could vary from
community to community, and the degree of the courts' oversight
could partially reduce majority bias as a whole.
In Germany, however, non-traditional religious majorities are
extremely unlikely to gain significant political power. Relatively
few people from Turkey or the former Yugoslavia-the vast
majority of Muslims, in other words-are German citizens, both
because those born in Germany to foreign parents do not
automatically acquire German citizenship, and because German
law generally requires those who seek German citizenship to
renounce their citizenship in other countries. 495
Although
citizens of European Community member states may vote in local
elections, this does not include people from Turkey or the former
Yugoslavia. 4 96 Moreover, electoral control of the schools is at the
state, not the local level. There are no local school boards, and
local decisions are thus executive ones. 4 97 This makes it unlikely
that non-mainstream religious majorities, including Christian
ones, will exercise significant control over the schools. Majorities
with no religious affiliation are now the norm in the former East

German

states,

but the

secular

speech

in which

those

495.
BEAUFTRAGTE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FOR AUSLANDERFRAGEN, MIGRATION
UND INTEGRATION IN ZAHLEN: EIN HANDBUCH [MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN NUMBERS:

A HANDBOOK], 74-75 (1997).

496. The Basic Law provides in Article 20(2) that "[all state authority shall
emanate from the people," which the Constitutional Court has interpreted to
mean that the right to vote may not be extended to aliens. A constitutional

amendment extends the limited voting rights to citizens of European Union
states. CURRIE, supranote 90, at 105 n. 12.
497. Interview with Walter Germun, Bavarian Ministry for Education,
Culture, Science, and Art, in Munich (Mar. 13, 1998).
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pose the same
governments are likely to engage does not
49 8
constitutional difficulties as religious speech.
All in all, comparing Germany and the United States provides
no answers to the problems of government religious speech. The

favored position

in the American

commentary,

prohibiting

government religious speech altogether, has generally failed to
deal squarely with the German objection that this approach
requires the government to favor secularism over religious views,
even when the institutions and wishes of the people lean heavily
in the other direction. A focus on private religious choice cannot,
moreover, be decoupled from a normative view about how the
political system should work. Even if we agree that the goal for
government religious speech is the recognition and promotion of
individual autonomy, and that such speech should reflect the
private institutions of the people, the catch is that we must reach
this goal through the political process.
The German approach has a normative view of how the
political process should work, and it leaves more to local outcome
within that process. The attendant dangers include a potential
bias toward majority religions, and judicial standards that
perhaps seem less opaque and thus less legitimate. German
reasoning could, on the other hand, encourage local decisionmaking and provide a consensus-based vision of how that process
might operate. Yet, ironically, this approach would perhaps be
more attractive in the United States, where local religious
majorities are more varied and have more political power,
particularly over the schools. 4 9 9 In Germany, on the other hand,
when I asked a member of the Bavarian Constitutional Court
whether he would uphold a state law that provided for nonChristian symbols in the classroom just as the current law

provides for crosses, his answer of "yes" seemed to come all too
quickly.5 0 0 There is simply no danger that the state of Bavaria
will provide for any religious symbols other than Christian ones in
the schools.

498. In the dispute in Brandenburg around the LER classes, however,
churches argue that the state's secular speech violates its obligation of neutrality
by portraying religion in an unfairly poor light. See supranote 144.
499. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Schools §§ 10, 53 (1993) (explaining that some
school board elections are local).
500. Interview with Dr. Gustav Lichtenberger, Justice of the Bavarian
Supreme Court, in Munich (Mar. 13, 1998).
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VI. CONCLUSION

We will never face Germany's specific problems of religion
and government, arising as they do from its particular history.
The sharply contested religion cases from Germany in the late
1990s do, however, point to problems with our growing reliance
on private religious choice analysis that demand our attention in
both government funding and speech cases. To understand the
problems of funding religious groups in neutral programs, we
must back up and ask the foundational question: what goals may
the government pursue with its funding?
The broader those
goals are defined, the greater the potential distortion of private
religious choice, through either inclusion or exclusion from the
programs. To fully make sense of government funding and the
Establishment Clause, we must consider its role in protecting the
power of public discourse within the larger political process.
The same holds for government religious speech: individual
autonomy points in a number of different directions, leaving us
with choices among different kinds of distortion and different
roles for the courts, which we cannot resolve based on private
religious choice alone. The German cases focus us on one
normative vision of the political process which will probably never
become our vision, but which does help us to see that even our
decisions about government religious speech depend upon our
assumptions and aspirations about the political process. The
appeal of comparative law lies in the details, and the details of the
current disputes in Germany around religion and government ask
us to think again about exactly what we expect from the
Establishment Clause here in America.*

* Special thanks to Michelle Ida Turner for her many translations that appear
in the footnotes. Translations in the text, except of the Basic Law, are the
Author's.

